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THE SHAREHOLDER DIRECT ACCESS TEETER-
TOTTER: WILL INCREASED SHAREHOLDER VOICE
IN THE DIRECTOR NOMINATION PROCESS
PROTECT INVESTORS?
PATTY M. DEGAETANO*
INTRODUCTION
The two-year period of 2001-2002 will be remembered for the
massive corporate and accounting scandals that impacted the United
States' securities markets. In a time of rising stock market frenzy, a
few giants were able' to influence the financial fate of hundreds of
thousands of people. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia started
the tidal wave-many more have fallen or are currently under
investigation. Some say the regulatory reforms spawned in reaction to
these scandals may be the most significant in corporate America since
passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.1
Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
moved swiftly to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to contain the
damage and begin to restore investor confidence. On its heels, addi-
tional regulatory actions were taken by the self-regulatory organiza-
tions. The New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange,
and the National Association of Securities Dealers on behalf of the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations sys-
tem each adopted new listing requirements for publicly traded compa-
nies.
* J.D., magna cum laude, California Western School of Law, 2004; B.S., magna cum
laude, Business Administration-Finance, with Distinction in Finance, San Diego State Uni-
versity, 1999. I would like to thank California Western Professor Gloria Sandrino for her in-
valuable guidance.
1. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company's
Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. LAW. 67, 68 (2003).
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The impact of this new regulatory regime is just beginning to take
hold. The ripple effect is being felt inside boardrooms as directors,
executive officers, and managers scramble to comply with the new
rules and pay for their corresponding costs, provide the level of real
and perceived independence necessary, and show increased sensitivity
to the heightened level of scrutiny on their decisions. While corporate
boards are reevaluating or lowering the levels of risk they are now
willing to accept, the costs of compliance with the new regulatory
scheme have skyrocketed. Will these new rules adequately ensure
that boards of directors will, prospectively, oversee their corporations
effectively, and will those "independent" directors truly be account-
able to and protect their shareholders? Time will yet tell.
Ever vigilant for the optimal level of shareholder protection, the
SEC, in its role as watchdog and advocate for the investing public, has
continued its quest by instituting a comprehensive review of the proxy
rules. This review culminated in the July 15, 2003, Staff Report2 that
has prompted two new rules directly relating to members of the board.
The first rule,3 mostly favored by commentators, is now final and
will provide shareholders more robust disclosure regarding the proc-
esses and considerations of the nominating committee of a public
company, including the consideration of director candidates recom-
mended by shareholders. 4 Shareholders will hereafter know what fac-
tors impact the nominating committee's recommendations, what skills
and qualities they consider necessary in a nominee, how they go about
selecting the candidates, and also whether any candidate names were
submitted on behalf of a five percent holder.5 In addition, the rule sets
up a new structure that should ensure shareholders can more easily
communicate with members of the board.6 These increased transpar-
encies may even cause companies to reconsider how their recruitment
efforts are being conducted.
2. Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Election
of Directors, Division of Corporation Finance (July 15, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf [hereinafter Staff Report].
3. Final Rule: Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communi-
cations Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 33-
8340 (Nov. 24, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 69,204 (Dec. 11, 2003) (codified in part at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8340.htm [hereinafter Nomi-
nating Committee Rule].
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
362 [Vol. 41
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The second rule,7 highly controversial, proposes to change the
paradigm by which directors of a public company can be nominated.
Under certain circumstances, a company could be required to include
in its proxy materials a shareholder's nominees for election as direc-
tor,8 in effect allowing the shareholder to run a proxy battle at the
company's expense. After receiving more than 14,000 comment let-
ters on the proposed rule, the SEC is continuing to evaluate the viabil-
ity and impact of this proposal.9 The goal of the new paradigm is to
further protect investors, but whether this is the best way to accom-
plish this worthy goal is yet to be seen.
This article asks whether allowing individual shareholders to use
company proxy materials to nominate their candidates for directors
will ensure an effective method of electing a board of directors that
will best protect and create value for all of the company's sharehold-
ers. The article contends that recent corporate scandals have caused
both the investing community and regulatory agencies to have a
heightened sensitivity to corporate governance issues. Because of this
sensitivity, the theoretical battle has resurfaced between the "more is
better" philosophy, which aims to increase shareholder voice and con-
trol, and the overall best interests of the corporation and all of its
shareholders (i.e. the teeter-totter effect). While boards and the share-
holders they serve have the same ultimate goal, they sometimes pro-
pose to go about reaching that goal differently. This article argues
that the proposed shareholder direct access rule is unnecessary given
the existing regulatory scheme, will not provide a meaningful new
tool for shareholders, and unnecessarily preempts an area of corporate
law which is adequately and traditionally regulated by state law. Fur-
thermore, the new rule would create undue havoc if imposed while
corporations are struggling to comply with the significant new bur-
dens imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the new self-
regulatory rules and listing requirements, and the SEC's other new
rules and regulations, all of which are specifically poised to address
the concerns stemming from the recent corporate scandals. The new
regulatory scheme is proving extremely costly in terms of both human
and hard capital, and there is no clear benefit in imposing additional
costs and rules on corporations that are already significantly burdened,
until the effects of the existing new rules can be assessed. The pro-
7. Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No.
34-48626 (Oct. 14, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm [hereinafter Proposed Rule].
8. Id.
9. Id.
363
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posed rule is overkill. This article suggests that because both directors
and the shareholders they serve have a common goal of increasing
shareholder value, through a "back to basics" framework whereby
"playing fair" is the overriding concept, they can work together under
the existing regulatory scheme to meet each side's responsibilities and
goals. Neither party needs to be on the down side of the teeter-totter
all of the time.
Part I of this article will describe the recent corporate scandals and
excesses that have understandably caused this heightened sensitivity
to corporate governance issues and scrutiny of actions inside the board
room, leading to a renewed call for truly independent directors. It will
also explore recent trends and reforms in shareholder power and the
election process, and it will outline the regulatory reforms that were
the reaction to this era of scandal. Part II will dissect the Proposed
Rule, which will allow security holders to participate directly in the
nomination process by including a nominee in the company's proxy
materials. It will also describe related proxy and securities rules that
would be impacted by the proposed security holder nomination rule.
Part III will examine the Proposed Rule's ability to protect sharehold-
ers, in light of its questionable legal authority and hurdles to practical
implementation. While increased shareholder voice sounds good in
theory and may serve the specific goals of a handful of shareholders,
this article argues that the Proposed Rule will likely not protect all
shareholders. It posits, instead, that the existing regulatory frame-
work, much of it new and yet untested and unproven, is a sufficient
framework within which shareholders and directors can work together
for the best interests of their company.
I. CORPORATE SCANDALS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2001-2002)
Enron. WorldCom. Tyco. Adelphia. These names will not be
soon forgotten, even by our grandchildren. Enron and its progeny
would cause an unimaginable ripple effect on the market, as tens of
billions of dollars of market capital was destroyed, workers' retire-
ment plans were devastated, shareholders' dreams were ruined, and
individual investors' trust in the stock market was shattered.'0 These
giants in corporate America have made an indelible mark on corporate
history, not only because of the hundreds of thousands of people that
10. NANCY B. RAPOPORT & BALA G. DHARAN, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS xi (2004) (collection of essays which examine the causes and consequences of
Enron's failure from business, financial, legal and ethical perspectives).
[Vol. 41
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were personally impacted when they lost their life savings or when
they lost the job that allowed them to put dinner on the table, but be-
cause of the sweeping regulatory reform that has been spurred on in
response to their actions. The tidal wave of scandal and reactive regu-
lation has begun.
A. The Tidal Wave Begins
1. Enron Corp.
The news flashes that broke the story "defied explanation [-]
$30 million of self-dealing by the chief financial officer, $700 million
of net earnings going up 'in smoke, $1.2 billion of shareholders' equity
disappearing as if by erasure of a blackboard, more than $4 billion in
hidden liabilities-and all in a company theretofore viewed as an ex-
emplar."'" Everyone wondered how this could happen in the shadows
of a corporate governance and disclosure system said to be the envy of
the world. 2
Enron was the first in the string of recent corporate scandals that
have highlighted the systemic corporate governance failures in Amer-
ica. It led the way for new investor demand for transparency and
regulatory reform, when the market discovered that it could no longer
rely on "professional 'gatekeepers'-auditors, analysts, and others-
whom the market has long trusted to filter, verify and assess compli-
cated financial information."' 3 In addition to challenging the belief
that the United States' corporate governance and disclosure systems
were the best in the world, the Enron collapse has led many to ques-
tion the belief that the United States' capital markets, especially for
large publicly traded corporations, '4 are "highly efficient."' 5 The En-
ron story is not unlike several others that followed.
11. William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders and
Other Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275,
1282 (2002).
12. Id.
13. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57
Bus. LAW. 1403, 1404-05 (2002) (discussing the necessary role of auditors and lawyers as
gatekeepers to supplement the monitoring by inside corporate management, outside institu-
tions and governmental agencies, and suggesting approaches to correct the problems which
led to "gatekeeper failure" in the Enron collapse). "[G]atekeepers are reputational intermedi-
aries who provide verification and certification services to investors," and typically include
independent auditors, debt rating agencies, securities analysts, investment bankers, and in
some instances, lawyers. Id. at 1405.
14. A publicly traded company is one that is required to file periodic and annual reports
with the SEC, pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)
(2004) [hereinafter Exchange Act], as a result of an effective registration statement for a class
365
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The economic climate precipitating the 2001 Enron scandal con-
tributed to the general public's attitude regarding corporate govern-
ance matters in place prior to Enron. Following the mid-1980s market
decline, the securities markets had been rising steadily, due in part to
the advances in technology, "computerization, the Internet, and the
telecommunications boom."' 16 There was an air of optimism and faith
in the American corporate governance system, believed to be far "su-
perior to any other in the world."' 7 The steadily rising stock prices fu-
eled the public's optimism and belief that the stock market was on a
roll and that stock prices would "continue to'rise 'as far as the eye
[could] see.""' 8 Along came Enron.
Enron Corp., led by chairman and CEO Kenneth Lay, was formed
in 1985 upon the merger of Houston Natural Gas with InterNorth, a
natural gas company based in Nebraska, creating the first nationwide
natural gas pipeline company.19 It soon expanded into trading natural
gas and other energy-related commodities, as a result of Jeff Skilling's
idea for a "natural gas bank," and was eventually ranked as the sev-
enth largest U.S. company based on revenue.2" It gained an interna-
tional presence as it expanded through opening offices abroad and ac-
of equity securities under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) and (g).
15. See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and En-
ron, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 394, 394-95 (2004). The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
(ECMH), in its "semistrong form," suggests that share prices of public companies react
quickly to reflect all publicly available information, resulting in stock prices being properly
valued by the investing public. Id. at 396. However, one author suggests that while the
ECMH is still a worthy academic theory, it was irrelevant in Enron's case because the market
was "unable to penetrate the 'cloud cover' of those accounting gimmicks," thereby allowing it
to hide "massive amounts of debt under a complicated matrix of thousands of special purpose
entities structured as off-shore partnerships." Id. at 397.
16. Robert W. Hamilton, The Seventh Annual Frankel Lecture Address: The Crisis in
Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 Hous. L. REv. 1, 6 (2003).
17. Id.; see also Bratton, supra note 11, at 1282 (commenting on views of corporate
self-regulation in the 1990s).
18. Hamilton, supra note 16, at 6 & n.14 (citing Jacob M. Schlesinger & Nicholas
Kulish, A Century of Booms, and How They Ended-The Usual Causes of Death-Inflation
and Inept Policies-Aren't Afoot in America Yet, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2000, at BI (examining
the potential end to "'the great turn-of-the-millennium boom' but noting that 'most folks...
see nothing but sunny skies well into the future')). One commentator captured this same at-
titude by noting, "In the 1990s, corporate self-regulation [in the United States was] widely
thought to have reached a high plateau of evolutionary success due to proliferating good prac-
tices and sophisticated institutional monitoring." Bratton, supra note 11, at 1282.
19. See Enron Milestones, July 1985, at http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/mile-
stones/frameset.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005); Enron Timeline, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 17,
2002, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/enron/I 127125.
20. See Douglas M. Branson, Enron-When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or
Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 989, 996-98 (describing En-
ron's strategy); Gary Katz, Enron, CBC News Online (Feb. 2002), at http://www.
cbc.ca/news/features/enron.html (on file with author).
6
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quiring foreign companies. 2' The Enron employees showed their op-
timism and confidence in the company by investing a significant por-
tion of their 401(k) retirement plan funds in Enron's common stock,
which was traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).22
The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS)
also showed its support of Enron by entering into several investment
partnership contracts with Enron (named JEDI, short for Joint Energy
Development Investments). 23  In 1993, CalPERS and Enron each in-
vested $250 million to form JEDI, an off-balance sheet joint venture
investment partnership. 24  In 1997, Enron created Chewco Invest-
ments, L.P., 25 a non-consolidated "special purpose entity"26 composed
of Enron executives and formed to buy out CaIPERS' share of JEDI
for $383 million. 7 After selling its shares of JEDI, CalPERS agreed
to invest in another partnership with Enron, JEDI II, in which each
was to invest $500 million.28
Enron's expansion and acquisitions continued over the next sev-
eral years. In June 1999, Andrew Fastow, Enron's CFO, proposed the
creation of two partnerships, LJM1 in June 1999 and LJM2 in October
1999, in which he was the manager and an investor.29 Enron entered
21. Enron Timeline, supra note 19.
22. See Katz, supra note 20. Despite the opportunity to invest in nineteen other invest-
ment vehicles, over sixty percent of the fund was made up of Enron stock, evidencing the em-
ployee confidence and support. Id.
23. See Kathleen Pender, CalPERS Had Enron Because Many Did, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 9,
2001, at GI, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-binlarticle.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/
12/09/BU208202.DTL (explaining the basic financial details of CalPERS' investments in the
two JEDI partnerships).
24. See William C. Powers, Jr. et al., Report of Investigation by the Special Investiga-
tive Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 6 (Feb. 1, 2002), at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreportO2OlO2.pdf (Feb. 22, 2004)
[hereinafter Powers Report].
25. Chewco was "named after the Chewbacca character in 'Star Wars."' Pender, supra
note 23.
26. See Powers Report, supra note 24, at 6-7. The Powers Report details the actions of
the Enron board in reviewing and approving various partnerships, all later discovered to have
been improperly accounted for. Id.
27. See Pender, supra note 23. Inquiries into the JEDI partnership followed after
CalPERS sold its interest back to Enron, but "no one ... suggested that CalPERS was in-
volved in any wrongdoing." Id. In 1998, CalPERS and Enron formed JEDI II, "another pri-
vate equity limited partnership." Id. Although CalPERS had tentatively committed $500 mil-
lion to JEDI II, it actually only invested $156 million because of the uncertainty surrounding
the energy crisis which broke out in 2000. Id.
28. See Pender, supra note 23.
29. See Powers Report, supra note 24, at 68-76. Fastow was to serve as both a general
and limited partner for LJMI and LJM2. See id. at 70-71, 74. Enron used these special pur-
pose entities to "inflate revenues via sham 'left-hand to right-hand' transactions and [to] con-
ceal debt." George W. Kuney, Everything I Needed to Know About Enron I Learned in Kin-
dergarten (and Graduate School), in RAPOPORT & DHARAN, supra note 10, at 880. Enron was
7
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into more than twenty transactions with the two partnerships. 3° As
time went on, the number of unconsolidated partnerships increased.
In January 2000, Fortune magazine named Enron "The Most Innova-
tive Company in America" for the fifth consecutive year and ranked
Enron 24th in a survey listing the "100 Best Companies to Work for in
America."'" By March 2000, Enron was the sixth largest energy com-
pany in the world based on market capitalization, according to the En-
ergy Financial Group.32 In February 2001, Jeffrey Skilling was named
president and CEO.33 Although several news articles questioned the
profitability of Enron as well as other energy companies over the next
year, Enron was named "The Most Innovative Company in America"
in 2001 by Fortune magazine for a sixth consecutive year. 34
But the tide began to turn in early 2001 after inquiries by a highly-
regarded firm that specialized in short-selling began to question En-
ron's low profitability, indirect relationship between cash flow from
operations and reported earnings, and most importantly, the "'infa-
mous' partnerships. 35  Then came Skilling's "shocking announce-
ment" that he was resigning from his post as president and CEO for
"personal reasons" in August 2001, less than seven months after he
began, amidst a time when he was aggressively selling his personal
Enron stock.36 Questions about Enron's credibility had started to im-
pact its stock price, which had fallen from $80 at the beginning of the
year to the low $40s in mid-August. 37
Despite internal controls that were initially designed to monitor
the related-party transactions, which proved to be ineffective due to
lack of implementation and oversight, it was ultimately determined
that the LJM transactions actually resulted in sham asset sales and
driven to "manage" its financial statements'because of its need for cash and its need to main-
tain an investment grade credit rating. Id. at n.14 (citing NEAL BATSON, THE SECOND INTERIM
REPORT OF NEAL BATSON, COURT-APPOINTED EXAMINER (2003), available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/examniner2.html).
30. See Powers Report, supra note 24, at 8-17, 68-76.
31. See Enron Milestones, supra note 19.
32. Id.
33. Bethany McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58.
34. See id. (noting that Enron was voted "Most Innovative Among Fortune's Most Ad-
mired Companies" and that by 2000 it was the seventh-largest company on the Fortune 500).
35. Id. In examining Enron's public documents, Jim Chanos from Kynikos Associates
"took note of an odd and opaque mention of transactions that Enron and other 'Entities' had
done with a 'Related Party' that was run by 'a senior officer of Enron."' Id. This appeared to
him to be a clear conflict of interest. See id.
36. See id.; see also Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Announces Skilling Resignation;
Lay Assumes President and CEO Duties, http://www.enron.corm/corp/pressroomlreleases/
2001/ene/58-ENE-SkillingResignation-08-14-01-LTR.html (Aug. 14, 2001).
37. McLean, supra note 33.
[Vol. 41
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sham hedging transactions designed to circumvent the accounting
rules.38 Eventually, Enron was forced to include these off-balance
sheet entities on its balance sheet, resulting in huge write-offs and a
major announcement that would begin its eventual fall.39
On October 16, 2001, Enron reported a quarterly loss of $618 mil-
lion and a more than $1 billion reduction in shareholder equity.' In
response to Wall Street's increased demands for more information
about Enron's financial performance, the Wall Street Journal pub-
lished a three-day series of articles on the Enron partnerships .4  Dur-
ing that same month, Enron top management had frozen employee
401k plan accounts; however, top executives were not similarly re-
stricted and continued heavy selling of shares purchased through the
company's stock option plan.42 Insiders reaped huge profits from per-
sonal stock sales, including $23 million from sales in 2001 and
$70 million from redemptions for Kenneth Lay, and $15.6 million be-
fore his resignation and $15 million after for Jeffrey Skilling. 4
In November 2001, Enron filed its Form 8-K with the SEC an-
nouncing that Chewco, JEDI, and several other off-balance sheet lim-
ited partnerships should have been included in its consolidated finan-
cial statements pursuant to generally accepted accounting principals,
and that it was restating its financial statements for 1997 through the
first two quarters of 2001 because of an earnings overstatement
amounting to $586 million, or 20 percent.' By the end of November,
Enron's share price had fallen from its all-time high of more than $90
to its lowest in a decade at $4.45 These disclosures hastened Enron's
38. Powers Report, supra note 24, at 8-15.
39. Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Reports Recurring Third Quarter Earnings of
$0.43 Per Diluted Share, http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/releases/2001/ene/68-
3QEarningsLtr.html (Oct. 16, 2001).
40. Id.; see also Jathon Sapsford & Suzanne McGee, Enron's Financial Troubles Rever-
berate to Bonds with Poor Liquidity and Credit-Rating Concerns, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2001,
at C 14.
41. See, e.g., John Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron Jolt: Investments, Assets Gen-
erate Big Loss, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2001, at Cl; Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller,
Partnership Spurs Enron Equity Cut, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at Cl; Rebecca Smith &
John R. Emshwiller, Enron CFO's Partnership Had Millions in Profit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19,
2001, at CI.
42. Bratton, supra note 11, at 1293.
43. id. (citing various news accounts of the story).
44. See Form 8-K filed by Enron, dated Nov. 8, 2001; Press Release, Enron, Enron Pro-
vides Additional Information About Related Party and Off-Balance Sheet Transactions; Com-
pany to Restate Earnings for 1997-2001, available at http://www.enron.com/
corp/pressroom/releases/2001/ene78-SECReleaseLtr.htm (Nov. 8, 2001); McLean, supra
note 33, at 58; Pender, supra note 23.
45. See Rebecca Smith & Robin Sidel, Enron and Dynegy May Cut Price of Deal by
40%, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at A3; Timeline: Enron (Feb. 4, 2002), at
369
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eventual demise and prompted an investigation by the SEC. By the
end of November, Standard & Poor's downgraded Enron bonds to
high-risk junk bond status, and on December 2, Enron filed for protec-
tion from its creditors under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.46
In hindsight, Enron's fall is not as confusing or cloudy as the
thousands of special purpose entities make it appear.47 At the core
was "accounting chicanery" about its off-balance sheet financing and
related-party transactions, and "colossal failures" by its board in carry-
ing out its oversight function.48 One commentator labeled Enron's
corporate governance structure as sui generis because of the "madden-
ingly unique" core facts that led to its failure.49 Not only had Enron
incorporated thousands of subsidiaries in a "complex web of off-
balance sheet partnerships," the board had allowed the company's
chief financial officer to head an independent entity that transacted
billions of dollars of risky and volatile trades with Enron." Then they
allowed the senior officers to profit from these self-dealing transac-
tions without supervising or comprehending the profits involved.5'
A detailed view from inside the organization was enlightening.
The Enron board formed a Special Investigative Committee in Octo-
ber 2001 to investigate the related-party transactions that led to the
earnings restatement. 52 The Special Committee found that the related-
party transactions and accounting errors were the culmination of fail-
ures by many people at many levels, including "a flawed idea, self-
enrichment by employees, inadequately-designed controls, poor im-
plementation, inattentive oversight, simple (and not-so-simple) ac-
counting mistakes, and overreaching in a culture that appears to have
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4342321 - 110384,00.html.
46. See McLean, supra note 33, at 58.
47. The SEC moved swiftly to close the disclosure inadequacy highlighted by Enron and
its use of off-balance sheet special purpose entities. In January 2003, the SEC adopted new
final rules under Section 401(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that require additional disclosure
regarding off-balance sheet arrangements and certain aggregate contractual obligations in an
issuer's Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Results of Op-
erations. See generally Final Rule: Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis
About Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Exchange
Act Release No. 33-8182 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8182.htm; 68 Fed. Reg. 5982 (Feb. 5, 2003).
48. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in
Enron's Dark Shadows, 57 Bus. LAw. 1421, 1426 & n.31 (2002).
49. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 1403.
50. Id. at 1403-04.
51. Id. at 1403.
52. Powers Report, supra note 24, at 3.
370 [Vol. 41
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encouraged pushing the limits [, all of which] could and should have
been avoided. '5 3
The Special Committee specifically found that certain top man-
agement had personally enriched themselves by tens of millions of
dollars, without providing proper disclosure to the board of their per-
sonal interests.54 Even more importantly, it found that the company,
with the assistance of its outside independent auditor, Arthur Ander-
sen, had structured many of the related-party transactions through spe-
cial purpose entities to accomplish favorable financial statement re-
suits, rather than bona fide economic objectives or risk transfer.55
Other transactions were improperly implemented to offset losses, re-
sulting in Enron concealing very large losses and "creating an appear-
ance that those transactions were hedged," when in fact they were
not.56 In addition to failing to note or take action regarding the defi-
ciencies in Enron's public disclosure about its related-party transac-
tions, the Special Committee also found that Arthur Andersen failed to
report its "serious reservations" about the related-party transactions to
the board's Audit and Compliance Committee and instead told the
board that the disclosure was adequate and that it would issue an un-
qualified audit opinion.57 It was later discovered that both Enron and
Arthur Andersen engaged in document shredding to cover up the En-
ron fraud, and Arthur Andersen was later convicted of obstruction of
justice.58 Lastly, the Special Committee found that Enron's outside
legal counsel, Vinson & Elkins, failed to sufficiently explore the re-
lated-party disclosure. 9 This was failure in corporate governance sys-
tems and by the company's gatekeepers, on a massive scale. For the
next seven months, Enron's billion-dollar bankruptcy proceeding
53. Id. at 27-28. "Though the [Special Committee's] report presents the [board's] action
in somewhat sanitized and exculpatory fashion, it is hard to agree that a board presiding over
the Enron mess discharged its oversight obligations as a practical matter." Cunningham, su-
pra note 48, at 1426 n.31.
54. Powers Report, supra note 24, at 3-4.
55. Id. at 4-5. In addition to its regular audit fees, "[Arthur] Andersen billed Enron
$5.7 million for advice in connection with the Chewco and IM transactions alone." Id. at 5.
According to Enron's 2001 proxy statement, it paid Arthur Andersen $25 million in auditor
fees and $27 million in consulting fees. Bratton, supra note 11, at 1349 (citing Enron Sched-
ule 14A, filed Mar. 21, 2000, at 13). Enron was Arthur Andersen's second largest client na-
tionwide, and several of Enron's top accounting officers were former Arthur Andersen ac-
countants. Id.
56. Powers Report, supra note 24, at 4.
57. Id. at 25.
58. See Flynn McRoberts et al., Ties to Enron Blinded Andersen, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3,
2002, at 1; Flynn McRoberts et al., Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4,
2002, at 1.
59. Powers Report, supra note 24, at 26.
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would hold the record for the largest in United States history.60 But
Enron was only the beginning.
2. The Tidal Wave of Other Scandals
Enron was evidence that the nature of "earnings management"
had begun to change, as managers shifted their focus from striving to
level out earnings swings to aggressively advancing the moment of
revenue recognition." Not surprisingly, in hindsight, accounting scan-
dals rose in response to the trend of premature revenue recognition.62
Managers were increasingly willing to recognize income prematurely,
effectively "misappropriating" it from the proper future period in
which it should have been recognized. 63 This willingness of managers
to engage in "creative accounting" was fueled by the need to satisfy
the market and the forecasts of security analysts covering the firm be-
cause even a modest earnings shortfall had the potential to produce
dramatic market penalties when dissatisfied investors sold their
stock. 64
The tidal wave had begun. While regulators were working to pre-
vent further Enron-like situations and to restore investor confidence in
the markets,65 they were not quick enough. Along came WorldCom,
60. Scott Siamas, Primary Securities Fraud Liability For Secondary Actors: Revisiting
Central Bank of Denver in the Wake of Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 895, 896 (2004) (citing William F. Dietrich, Legal and Ethical Issues for At-
torneys Dealing with Financial Data: Heightened Scrutiny After the Enron and Andersen
Debacle, 1325 PLl/Corp. 925, 936 (2002)).
61. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic His-
tory of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 276-78 (2004) (identifying common denomina-
tors among recent cases of corporate scandal and arguing that unregulated conflicts of interest
will continue to allow financial irregularities to repeat themselves).
62. See id. at 277.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. During this time, the SEC was undergoing a major change in leadership. President
Bush had appointed Harvey Pitt as Chairman of the SEC in mid-2001. Steven Andersen, You
Are in the... Waiting Game: History Predicts a Long Road to Governance Reform 13 CORP.
LEGAL TIMES 142, Sept. 2003, at col. 1. Pitt envisioned transforming the SEC into a "kinder
and gentler" agency that offered "respect and cooperation," but was labeled a "toothless
watchdog." See Steve A. Radom, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Fed-
eral Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, 301 (2003) (quoting Seth W. Feaster, The Incredible
Shrinking Stock Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, at 14); Karen Tumulty, Is Pitt's SEC a
Toothless Watchdog?, CNN.Com (July 1, 2002), at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/
ALLPOLITICS/07/01/time.watchdog/. However, Pitt's tenure was filled with controversy,
and some say he committed a huge "gaffe" when he suggested that former FBI director Wil-
liam Webster, a member of the audit committee of U.S. Technologies, a company then under
investigation by the SEC for fraud, lead the newly formed Public Accounting Oversight
Board. See Anderson, supra. Pitt's short reign ended in a pressured resignation in November
2002. See News in Brief: Fed Chief to Lead Accounting Oversight Board, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 16,
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parent of MCI and the nation's second-largest long-distance telephone
provider.' Although the amount of WorldCom's financial fraud was
staggering, its accounting shenanigans amounted to "a simple book-
keeping trick"6 7 instead of a "complex web of off-balance sheet [spe-
cial purpose] partnerships."68 During 2001 and early 2002, World-
Com incorrectly capitalized $3.8 billion as relating to fees paid for
phone line use of other telecom companies, instead of booking these
charges as ordinary expenses.69 Instead of immediately booking the
current expense and thereby burdening net income, WorldCom's crea-
tive accounting treated the charges as "capital assets depreciated over
many years. '7 This resulted in a misallocation of almost $4 billion of
the total $16 billion in line costs. 7I The restatement resulted in annual
and quarterly losses totaling $1.2 billion,72 instead of the previously
reported net income of $1.4 billion for 2001 and $172 million for the
first quarter of 2002. 73 In July 2002, WorldCom filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition, nearly doubling the record for the largest U.S.
bankruptcy proceeding, previously held by Enron.74
Adelphia Communications Corporation and Tyco International
Ltd. were quick to follow in the tide of corporate scandals. In May
2002, an investigation was launched into the activities of the founding
family of Adelphia, a large cable broadcast company, for significant
misuse of corporate funds relating to a series of unsuccessful family
ventures.75 Self-dealing allegations against the company and its CEO
2003, at col. 1.
66. See Shawn Young et al., WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Debt, Scandal Over-
whelm; Operations Set to Continue During a Reorganization, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002, at
A3.
67. Cunningham, supra note 48, at 1426 n.29.
68. Coffee, supra note 13, at 1404; see William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How
American Investors Got Taken for Trillions by Corporate Insiders, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
69, 108 (2002) (pointing to failure of the professional gatekeepers when Andersen overlooked
WorldCom's $7 billion of fraudulent accounting entries). Following the Enron scandal,
WorldCom switched auditors from Andersen to KPMG, another of the then "big five" ac-
counting firms, whose initial audit uncovered WorldCom's accounting fraud. See Peter El-
strom, Special Report: Scandals in Corporate America; How to Hide $3.8 Billion in Ex-
penses, Bus. WK., July 8, 2002, at 41.
69. See Elstrom, supra note 68.
70. See Cunningham, supra note 48, at 1426 n.29.
71. Id.
72. Young et al., supra note 66.
73. Elstrom, supra note 68, at 41.
74. See Young et al., supra note 66 (reporting WorldCom's assets listed at $107 billion,
thereby nearly doubling Enron's bankruptcy filing, which listed $63.4 billion in assets).
75. See Press Release, Adelphia Communications Corp., Adelphia Announces Devel-
opments Related to Issues Facing the Company (May 17, 2002), available at
http://www.adelphia.com/about/pdf2002.cfm; Larry Catd Backer, The Dut
,
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John Rigas, his two sons, and other top executives included using "bil-
lions of dollars of company money for personal use, including private
travel in a [company-owned] jet," company guarantees for private
loans used to purchase company stock, and "hiding $2.3 billion in
bank debt in off-balance sheet partnerships. 76 Adelphia sought bank-
ruptcy protection in June 2002, claiming that its filing was a direct re-
sult of its outside auditor's professional negligence and breach of con-
tractual duties.77 The bankruptcy liquidator filed suit against Deloitte
& Touche, the auditor, charging that Deloitte "either knew
or. .. should have known of... the Rigas family's self-dealing" and
failed to disclose this information to Adelphia's audit committee. 8
Later that year, Tyco, a large conglomerate, suffered severe losses
when allegations came to light of its questionable financial reporting
and the misuse of corporate funds by top executives to support their
lavish lifestyles.79 Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski and other top execu-
tives were criminally indicted for charges including tax evasion, grand
larceny, enterprise corruption, falsifying business records, and securi-
ties fraud, in addition to civil charges for failing to disclose secret
company loans.80
Each of these companies engaged in fraudulent accounting or cor-
porate practices by "cooking their books." The fallout from these
scandals subsequently "eroded the trust and confidence that is abso-
Emerging Obligations of Outside Lawyers and Auditors to Detect and Report Corporate
Wrongdoing Beyond the Federal Securities Laws, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 919, 928-29 (2003).
76. See CBS MarketWatch Scandal Sheet, at http://cbs.marketwatch.com/news/fea-
tures/scandalsheet.asp#CAndersen (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) (detailing who has been
charged or questioned and why, regarding recent major corporate scandals); see also Bill
Bergstrom, Adelphia Boss Took in $67 Million; Agents Document Hefty Advances From Ca-
ble Firm, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2002, at 6 (stating that bills from Rigas family-owned compa-
nies, including the Buffalo Sabres professional hockey team, a furniture and interior design
company, a car dealership, and a number of partnerships, were allegedly paid out of Adelphia
bank accounts); Amy Borrus et al., Corporate Probes: A Scorecard, Bus. WK., June 10, 2002,
at 42 (detailing recent corporate scandals and investigations, broken down by industry type).
77. Laurie Stewart, Bankrupt Adelphia Sues Deloitte; Cable Company Protests Ac-
countant's Practices, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 7, 2002, at 1.
78. Id.; Koken v. Steinberg, 825 A.2d 723, 725, 732 (Pa. Comrnmw. Ct. 2003) (dismissing
preliminary objections by Deloitte and finding that the bankruptcy liquidator's complaint
stated a cause of action for "various torts and breaches of contract in connection with
[Deloitte's] audit and actuarial services").
79. Backer, supra note 75, at 929. CEO Dennis Kozlowski was suspected of spending
company funds for personal purchases, including $11 million for art and decorating an $18
million duplex the company purchased for him in New York, and to purchase additional
homes for him in Florida and New Hampshire, which were neither reported to the company's
stockholders nor "widely known within the company itself." Kevin McCoy, Authorities
Widen Tyco Case, Look at Other Officials' Actions, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 2002, at Al.
80. CBS MarketWatch Scandal Sheet, supra note 76.
[Vol. 41
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lutely vital to the functioning of our capital markets."'" As a result,
investors became "understandably weak-kneed," in turn causing a
stock market loss of $7 trillion in value and the disappearance of more
than 1,000 companies, all in the short period from early 2000 to mid-
2002.82 Faced with massive layoffs at Enron, WorldCom, and the like,
and senior citizens who were now left with worthless retirement ac-
counts, the newly-impoverished investing public demanded swift and
strong government action.83 While the relative number of companies
that engaged in management dishonesty and suffered systematic fail-
ure of their internal controls and external auditing is small in both ab-
solute terms and as a percentage of public companies, virtually all
public companies would be impacted by the swift and serious reaction
of Congress, the SEC, and the stock exchanges. 84
Blatant fraudulent accounting or corporate practices were not all
that would mark this period in Corporate America's history, however.
Investors and the courts were becoming more sensitive to fiduciary
duties and good business practices, or the lack thereof. The key role
of the board of directors in "guiding the ship" through the potential
tidal waves was brought to the forefront.
B. Corporate Excesses
1. Role of the Directors
An important lesson is to be learned from the scandals at Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, and elsewhere: "An effective board of
directors is central to good corporate governance; and good corporate
governance, in turn, is central to good corporate performance."85 Di-
rectors hold in the palms of their hands the broad trust and confidence
of the shareholders, employees and creditors, who grant them author-
ity to ensure the corporation's success.86 But as the board of Enron
81. Jeanne Cummings et al., Bush Crackdown on Business Fraud Signals New Era,
WALL ST. J., July 10, 2002, at Al (quoting Representative Patrick Toomey at a House hearing
on WorldCom).
82. Feaster, supra note 65 (tracing the market decline according to the Wilshire 5000,
which tracks all publicly traded U.S.-based companies, showing a decrease from a high value
of $17.25 trillion on March 24, 2000, to $10.03 trillion on July 18, 2002).
83. Radom, supra note 65, at 301.
84. Teresa Camell & James J. Hanks, Jr., Shareholder Voting and Proxy Solicitation:
The Fundamentals, 37 MD. B.J. 23, 23 (2004) (explaining the complex process by which
shareholders of public companies vote).
85. Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on
the Role of Congress, in RAPOPORT & DHARAN, supra note 10, at 495.
86. Id.
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and others have starkly demonstrated, an ineffectual board that does
not put the interests of its shareholders first "cast[s] doubt on the en-
tire corporate governance system."87
The board of directors typically has broad authority under state
corporate law. Delaware is well known as the most important state for
purposes of corporate law because not only are a majority of public
companies incorporated there, other states look to Delaware corporate
law for guidance.8 8 Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law provides that the "business and affairs of every corpora-
tion.., shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of di-
rectors."89
The director also plays a central role under federal securities
laws.9° The bulk of a board's role is to advise management, assist in
the decision-making process, improve the business's operations, and
assess promising business opportunities and other transactions.9 One
of the other key roles for a public company board is monitoring man-
agement by selecting the chief executive officer and other members of
the senior management team, determining their compensation, and if it
should become necessary, replacing any of those persons. 92 The set of
legal constraints and duties within which the board operates recog-
nizes both this role and a certain level of duty owed by the board, and
directors can be held legally responsible for failing to adequately per-
form these duties. 93
2. Heightened Scrutiny of Director Fiduciary Duties
In the wake of recent corporate scandals, courts are scrutinizing
corporate decision-making and showing a greater sensitivity to direc-
tor responsibility and oversight, both in their actions and inactions.
Courts are further defining the duty of good faith, a breach of which
may cause the directors to lose their rights to corporate indemnifica-
87. Id.
88. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Re-
considering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553-54 (2002).
89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2004). This provision is typical of other states.
See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984).
90. The term "director" is defined under federal securities laws to mean "any director of
a corporation or any person performing similar functions with respect to any organization,
whether incorporated or unincorporated." Exchange Act § 3(a)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7)
(2004); Securities Act of -1933 [hereinafter Securities Act], Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405
(2004).
91. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 80.
92. Id.
93. Id.
376 [Vol. 41
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tion and charter provisions that can limit their liability according to
state law.
Directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its share-
holders in carrying out their duties. 94 Courts will generally afford di-
rectors protection under the "business judgment rule" when they have
acted in an informed manner, in good faith and in the best interests of
the corporation, but that protection comes only upon a showing that
they have exercised the requisite level of care.95 The recent cases of
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation96 and In re Abbott
Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation97 highlight the
heightened scrutiny being fixed upon the board's duty to its share-
holders.
In Walt Disney, the Delaware Chancery Court denied Disney's
motion to dismiss the derivative action brought by shareholders of The
Walt Disney Company. The shareholders brought suit against its
board of directors, alleging that the directors breached their fiduciary
duties by approving then president Michael Ovitz's generous em-
ployment agreement and by "impliedly" approving his "non-fault ter-
mination" that resulted in a severance compensation package of ap-
proximately $140 million.98  The court held that if true, the
shareholders' allegations "imply that the defendant directors knew that
they were making material decisions without adequate information
and without adequate deliberation," and that the directors' alleged
"conduct fell outside the protection of the business judgment rule." 99
The Abbott Laboratories case is also illustrative of the increasing
judicial emphasis on the duty of good faith. In this March 2003 deci-
sion,l°° the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that six years of
noncompliance, inspections, notices and warning letters, which re-
sulted in the FDA imposing upon Abbott the largest civil fine ever,
94. Felicia Smith, Corporate Governance: Seasoned Companies, 1279 PRAC. L. INST.
33RD ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 119, 150 (2001); see Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939).
95. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985)
("[U]nless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the directors' decisions were
primarily based on perpetuating themselves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty
such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uninformed, a Court will not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the board.").
96. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
97. In re Abbott Lab. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003) (apply-
ing Illinois law).
98. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 80 n.35 (citing Walt Disney, 825 A.2d at 277-
78, 282-89).
99. Id. (quoting Walt Disney, 825 A.2d at 289).
100. See Abbott Lab., 325 F.3d at 795.
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and the destruction and suspension of $250 million of corporate as-
sets, supported a reasonable assumption that the board had failed to
exercise its oversight duties. 101 The court found there was a "sustained
and systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight" that was "in-
tentional in that the directors knew of the violations of law, [and] took
no steps ... to prevent or remedy the situation."'0 2 Accordingly, the
court found "the directors' decision to not act was not made in good
faith and was contrary to the best interests of the company.""0 3
Other recent cases have shown a possible shift in the previously
required standard to plead and prove claims for "control person" li-
ability under the Exchange Act. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
imposes liability for securities violations on persons who directly or
indirectly control other persons who violate the securities laws." 4
Among other things, this holds directors and officers liable for any
false or misleading statement made by the company. In re WorldCom,
Inc. Securities Litigation"05 and In re Initial Public Offering Securities
Litigation,"6 both Second Circuit cases, held that "a plaintiff need not
plead nor ultimately prove that [the director or officer] acted with
[scienter] to be held secondarily liable" under Section 20(a)'s provi-
sion for control person liability. 7 Some predict that these decisions,
which reversed a previous trend requiring plaintiffs to plead scienter
or a culpable state of mind, will increase the likelihood of liability for
control persons under Section 20(a), because the plaintiffs burden has
been lessened.'08
3. No One Is Above Reproach
Even the "Big Board" has been swept in by the tidal wave. Rich-
ard Grasso, chairman and chief executive officer of the New York
Stock Exchange since 1995, resigned in September 2003 among pres-
sure from the board and other exchange members after news of his
101. Id. at 809.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2004).
105. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
106. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 396-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
107. See Richard Slack & Sirin Thada, Control Person Liability Under the Exchange Act;
Possible Shift in Standard in S.D.N. Y. (2003), at http://www.weil.com/.
108. Id. The largest number of securities class action claims is filed in the Second Cir-
cuit, making this circuit's jurisprudence on the subject of control person liability noteworthy.
Id. at n.2.
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$139.5 million compensation package came to light.'0 9 The SEC and
the New York Attorney General launched an investigation of Grasso's
total compensation award of $188 million as being "unreasonable and
not commensurate with his responsibilities" under New York's non-
profit law."10 Instead of setting an example of ethical leadership, fit-
ting for one hailed as an "elder statesman of the financial world," his
behavior has "shaken the faith of investors and the foundation of the
stock exchange.""' l In addition to reproachable conduct by the
NYSE's head man, NYSE floor trading specialists were ordered to
pay $240 million in penalties and fines due to trading abuses where
those specialists traded ahead of customer orders, allowing the spe-
cialists to benefit from advantageous prices and through "interposi-
tioning."112
C. The Callfor Independent Directors
The Enron debacle and the following tidal wave of scandals have
led to the reemergence of the debate over the value of, and what ex-
actly constitutes, an "independent director." Hindsight has shown that
many of the Enron outside directors had ties that made them arguably
not independent at all: several directors were part of "interlocking di-
109. Gretchen Morgenson & Landon Thomas, Jr., Corporate Conduct: The Overview;
Chairman Quits Stock Exchange in Furor Over Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, at Al.
Grasso's August 2003 employment contract provided for "payments totaling $139.5 million
in deferred compensation, savings and pension benefits," and included amounts he had de-
ferred and accumulated over his 20 years at the exchange. Id. He originally came to the
NYSE in 1968 as a clerk earning $82.50 per week. Id.
110. Landon Thomas, Jr., Grasso Refuses to Return Any of $139.5 Million Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at Cl [hereinafter Grasso Refuses]. Grasso's compensation award in-
cluded an additional $48 million under a second contract, which he chose to forego when his
pay controversy came to light. See Landon Thomas, Jr., Market Place; Exchange Said to
Want Move on Grasso Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at C1.
111. See Morgenson & Thomas, supra note 109. The investigation into Grasso's com-
pensation package included a review of his conduct while serving as a director of several ex-
change-listed companies, including Computer Associates, where that compensation commit-
tee approved a highly controversial compensation package awarding top executives more than
$1 billion in stock, and Home Depot, where Grasso served as an interlocking director with
Kenneth Langone, chairman of the NYSE's compensation committee. See Thomas, Grasso
Refuses, supra note 110.
112. Landon Thomas, Jr., Market Makers and Big Board Reach a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2004, at C I. The NYSE uses a 211-year-old "open outcry" trading model, whereby spe-
cialist traders on the exchange floor serve as middlemen to arrive at the best possible stock
price for an investor. Id. Specialists are allowed to intervene in a trade using their own capi-
tal only when there is no ready buyer and seller, but exchange rules specifically prohibit them
from "interpositioning," or stepping between an existing buyer and seller so that they may
capture the difference between the buy and sell order. Id.
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rectorates" in which they served together on other common boards; l1 3
three directors were high-ranking officers of a medical center that re-
ceived $1.9 million dollars from Enron and its top management;114 one
director was CEO of a company that did tens of millions of dollars of
business with Enron units and also acquired an Enron affiliate;" 5
seven of the fourteen directors, including three audit committee mem-
bers, had Enron consulting contracts, received donations to their non-
profit institutions, or their companies did business with Enron;' 6 and
another director served as a director of a company that was a major
Enron shareholder, yet that relationship was not disclosed. " 7
Independent directors serve to curb "agency costs"-the concern
that corporate officers may, at the expense of the corporation and its
shareholders, be inclined to shirk their duties or otherwise act in their
own self-interest." 8  Given recent corporate scandals, the value of
truly independent directors is being questioned anew. 119 The Ameri-
can system of corporate governance relies on independent directors as
one of the most effective devices for stockholder protection. 20 The
independent director also functions as a gatekeeper, with special trust
and responsibilities to the company's shareholders. While stockhold-
ers vote for and expect proper governance from directors, our courts
stand ready to enforce and hold directors accountable for that strong
bond of trust shareholders vest in them. 12'
However, one noted view is that there is a paradox relating to the
desirability of truly independent directors because, even though this is
the model recommended for public companies, independent directors
typically know less about the company than insiders, have less stake
113. See Christopher H. Schmitt et al., One Cozy Bunch, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
11, 2002, at 28.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Mark Jaffe, Enron Woes: The Board; Directors' Financial Ties, NAT'L POST, Nov.
30, 2001, available at 2001 WL 31020336.
117. Schmitt, supra note 113.
118. See Paredes, supra note 85, at 498 (citing several classic articles discussing agency
costs, including Eugene F. Farma, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288 (1980), and Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)).
119. See E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Cor-
porate Governance Practices-or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2181-82 (2001).
"Under Delaware fiduciary duty law, the independence of directors becomes critical in some
discrete areas. For example, two areas are interested director or controlling stockholder trans-
actions and derivative litigation.. .. Thus, the relevant inquiries are: Independent for what
purpose? Independence from whom?" Id.
120. Id. at2180,
121. Id.
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in decisions, and consequently "less incentive to get things right."' 122
Conversely, one bold commentator suggests that shareholders would
be better protected if we adopted the concept of a "professional inde-
pendent public director," one who would be registered and licensed by
the SEC to assure sufficient financial and legal sophistication, and
knowledge of corporate ethics principals, who would serve a limited
term with pre-established well-paid compensation, thereby effectively
serving as the "narc" among those "who would deal drugs."
' 123
The need to crystallize exactly who is an independent director,
how shareholders ensure that board seats are filled with those persons,
and how those persons are selected by the company and its sharehold-
ers is now, more than ever, of interest to shareholders.
D. Shareholder Power
Prior to the adoption of the new regulatory framework created by
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the new self-regulatory organiza-
tion (SRO) and SEC rules, shareholder input and director and manager
responsiveness were already increasing due to prior reforms and
trends. 2 4 These changes included increasing institutional ownership
of large public companies and the SEC's significant 1992 proxy rule
amendments that enhanced shareholder communications. 125  Institu-
tions have the potential to wield significant power over corporations
because of their ownership. While U.S. pensions hold 21.5% of total
corporate equities, U.S. institutions hold 49.8%.126 In addition to this
increased institutional strength, the SEC adopted major changes to its
proxy and other rules in 1992 that were designed to provide more lib-
eral shareholder communications, both among individual shareholders
and between shareholders and the company. 127  The proxy amend-
122. Id. at 2183. Might stockholders be better off with a board dominated by insiders
who have more time and incentive to do a better job? See id. at 2183-84. Quite possibly the
optimal is a balance of independent directors and knowledgeable insiders, with no "one size
fits all" when it comes to board composition. See id. at 2184.
123. See Lerach, supra note 68, at 107-08.
124. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 91.
125. Id.
126. NYSE Data Fact Book Online, at http://www.nysedata.comlfactbook/main.asp (last
visited Mar. 24, 2005). Percentages are based on latest available data, third quarter 2002.
127. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 91. See generally Final Rule: Regulation of
Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg.
48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992). The SEC was concerned that the cost of complying with the proxy
rules, and risk of liability for failure to comply, discouraged shareholders from communicat-
ing. Several other efforts by the SEC to enhance the shareholder communication process fol-
lowed. See, e.g., Final Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-40018 (May 21, 1998) (simplifying Rule 14a-8 by recasting it into a question
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ments also permitted "short slate" election contests, i.e., proxy con-
tests in which dissident shareholders nominate less than a full slate of
directors. ,28
1. The Election Process
The election process for corporate boards is unique to that setting
and does not mimic the nation's typical political process for electing
its leaders.'29 Traditionally, the role of shareholders has been to vote
for the slate of directors proposed by management. 30 However, if
they were unhappy with the performance of a company's directors,
they were not powerless and could simply replace the board 3' or sell
the stock.' But some claim the "safety valve" is missing-
shareholder power is really a myth, and it is rare for a director to be
replaced by shareholders because of cost and/or difficulty of waging a
proxy contest. 33
and answer format, reversing a no-action letter position on employment-related shareholder
proposals that raise social policy issues, and amending Rule 14a-4 to provide guidance to
companies exercising discretionary voting authority), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/finall34-40018.htm; Staff Legal Bulletin 14, Shareholder Proposals (July 13, 2001) (ex-
plaining the Rule 14a-8 no-action letter process and expressing the staff position on common
issues that arise), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legallcfslbl4.htm; Staff Legal Bul-
letin 14A, Shareholder Proposals (July 12, 2002) (modifying the staff position on Rule 14a-8
shareholder proposals relating to executive compensation plans), available at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb l4a.htm.
128. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 91. For an empirical analysis of the effect of
the 1992 proxy reforms, see generally Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the
1992 SEC Proxy Reforms, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 233 (2000).
129. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corpora-
tion Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. LAW. 1371, 1377 (2002).
130. Noted commentators have historically posited that management not only controls the
day-to-day business of a corporation, but also the board, due to their control over the election
process, thereby making the election of management-sponsored directors more assured. See
Paredes, supra note 85, at 499 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-70, 87-89 (1932) (arguing that agency
costs result from the separation of ownership and control that occurs when stock ownership is
disbursed and boards are passive)).
131. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) ("If the
stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of cor-
porate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.").
132. The ability of all shareholders, and particularly large institutions, to freely exit cor-
porate stock ownership is commonly referred to as the "Wall Street Walk." See, e.g., William
B. Chandler, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67
U. CtN. L. REV. 1083, 1090-92 (1999) (arguing that institutional shareholders should not be
relied on as "corporate monitors" because while institutional investors typically act to maxi-
mize share value, this may not create long-term efficiencies because their interests are not al-
ways aligned with individual shareholders).
133. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case For Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus.
LAW. 43, 45 (2003).
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In reality, nominating committees have more power than stock-
holders to shape board composition.'34 Because the existing proxy
process favors management's slate of directors, partially due to cost-
benefit considerations, incumbent directors are almost assured to keep
their slots and it is typically only in the takeover context that they
would really face a challenge. 135
2. Globalization & Technology
Globalization 136 has significantly impacted the world economy
and spurred more integration between national economies than ever
before. 37 The United States is at the forefront of the ever-expanding
global economy because of the explosion of new trade markets and
improved technology in the fields of communications and transporta-
tion. 38 Through globalization, many U.S. companies have been able
to achieve incredible financial success, and many multinational corpo-
rations have become "enormous economic giants with economies that
rival those of many developing countries.' ' 39
Advances in electronic communications technology have made e-
mail and the Internet both less expensive and more readily available,
thereby enhancing shareholders' ability to mobilize around selected
issues and "to implement sophisticated, wide-scale communication
programs" with other shareholders. 10 With globalization of the equity
capital markets, corporations formed outside of the United States have
also started to focus on "shareholder activism" issues such as greater
transparency, good corporate governance, and democratic sharehold-
ers' principles.'
134. Strine, supra note 129, at 1377.
135. Id.; see also William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on
Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1067, 1094-95 & n.83 (2002).
136. The term "globalization" refers to the current "worldwide economic revolution
which [extends] to all parts of the world." Frank Rene Lopez, Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity in a Global Economy After September 11, 55 MERCER L. REv. 739, 739 n. 1 (2004). It in-
cludes activities by multinational corporations, foreign investments and international loans,
and financial capital that flows between countries. Id. Globalization is a complex process
and many entities play a role, including the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and
the International Monetary Fund. Id.
137. Id. at 739.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 739-40.
140. Smith, supra note 94, at 136. This author cites the example of two shareholders who
met in an internet "chat room," decided to challenge management's slate of nominees, and ran
a proxy contest in which they garnered 15% of the total votes cast, for a cost of $15,000. Id.
141. Id. at 136-37.
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3. Institutional Shareholder Influence
While the formal role of shareholders effectively limits their in-
volvement in the ordinary business activities of a corporation, some
powerful institutional shareholders have begun to use their influence
to put pressure on the board and management to achieve those share-
holders' objectives. 4 2 Two of the most active institutional investors
are CalPERS and the Teachers Insurance and Annuity. Association-
College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF).' Pressure from
institutional investors like these often comes in the form of demands
that management deliver consistent financial results that conform to
previously announced projections.' In addition to their own sophis-
ticated internal research departments, these large institutional share-
holders often hire outside organizations such as Institutional Share-
holder Services, Investor Responsibility Research Center, or the
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility to assist them in analyz-
ing management proposals, and those outside analytical organizations
post on their websites their position and recommendations on specific
issues. 145
In negotiating with the board and management toward achieving
their objectives, institutional investors use their powerful leverage of
voting for or withholding support for management's director nominees
or other company proposals." And such a 'withhold' vote can actu-
ally make a difference, in part because the Delaware Chancery Court
has held that "withhold authority" proxy votes must be counted when
determining whether a particular nominee was indeed elected by a ma-
jority of "voting power present."'' 47
E. Recent Regulatory Reforms
Congressional reaction to the Enron scandal and other business
disasters proceeded quickly. Shortly after the Enron scandal erupted
and the WorldCom problems hit the media, public officials started to
142. Id. at 133.
143. Id. at 133 n.24; see also CalPERS, at http://www.calpers.org (last visited Mar. 25,
2005); TIAA-CREF, at http://www.tiaa-cref.org (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
144. See Smith, supra note 94, at 134.
145. Id. at 133 n.24.
146. Id. at 135.
147. Id. at 136; see North Fork Bancorporation, Inc. v. Toal, 825 A.2d 860, 869 (Del. Ch.
2000) (describing the concept of "withhold authority to vote for" as the SEC's compromise in
allowing shareholders to express dissent that goes beyond merely abstaining, which is the ef-
fect that an "against" vote would normally have under state law).
[Vol. 41
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speak out in favor of new and more demanding regulations and penal-
ties. 48 And the news media editorial pages endorsed those ideas for
increased regulation. 149
1. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
This call for tougher regulation and penalties led Congress to hur-
riedly pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which President Bush
immediately signed into law. 50 The statute significantly modified ex-
isting securities laws by calling for the creation of a new regulatory
oversight entity and modifying requirements for corporate disclosure
and parameters for accounting procedures. 5'
2. New NYSE & Nasdaq Listing Rules
The SEC soon followed with its approval of final corporate gov-
ernance rules and listing standards for the New York Stock Exchange
and the Nasdaq on November 4, 2003.152 The NYSE and Nasdaq List-
ing Rules required, among other things, that listed companies 5 3 have
independent nominating committees. 5 4
148. See Barrie McKenna, The WorldCom Debacle: Stiffer Rules, GLOBE & MAIL, June
27, 2002, at B5 (noting that Representative Billy Tauzin, Republican Chair of the House En-
ergy and Commerce Committee, which headed the congressional probe of Enron, had called
for "tough new laws" to restore confidence in America).
149. See, e.g., Christopher J. Dodd, Editorial, A Law That Protects Small Investors,
WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2002, at A23 (urging that the collapse of Enron should prompt legisla-
tors to reexamine securities and accounting laws).
150. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
151. See generally Abbe David Lowell & Kathryn C. Arnold, Corporate Crime After
2000: A New Law Enforcement Challenge or Deja Vu?, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 219 (2003)
(comparing the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, which prompted enactment of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L.
No. 107-73, 103 Stat. 183, with the corporate scandals that led to the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act).
152. See generally Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Gov-
ernance, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter NYSE and Nasdaq Listing Rules]. The NYSE rules were codified in Section 303A of the
NYSE' s Listed Company Manual, available at http://www.nyse.com/Frame-
set.html?displayPage=/listed/1022221393251 .html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) [hereinafter
NYSE Manual]; see also New York Stock Exchange, Final NYSE Corporate Governance
Rules (Nov. 4, 2003), available at http://www.nyse.compdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf. The
rules governing the Nasdaq are available online at NASD Manual Online, available at,
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) [hereinafter
NASD Rules], Shortly thereafter, the SEC also approved corresponding amendments to cor-
porate governance listing requirements for the American Stock Exchange. See Exchange Act
Release No. 34-48863, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,432 (Dec. 1, 2003).
153. The rules generally apply to all listed companies, but contain limited exceptions.
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In addition to strengthening the standards of independence for
board members, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and NYSE and Nasdaq List-
ing Rules require that the board consist of a majority of independent
directors, key committees (audit, governance/nominating, and com-
pensation) consist entirely of independent directors, and audit commit-
tee members meet yet stricter standards.'55 The Act and rules also
mandate expanded powers and responsibilities for committee mem-
bers, including the requirement that a company's audit committee set
the terms and compensation for the outside auditors and the company
pay for any outside advisors the committee may deem advisable to
hire. 5 6 In addition to their committee charters and corporate govern-
ance guidelines, companies are also required to adopt and publicly
disclose their codes of conduct and ethics that govern the actions of
directors, officers, and other employees.'57 Independent directors are
required to hold executive sessions on a regular basis,'5 8 and internal
mechanisms are mandated for reporting and responding to evidence of
potential wrongdoing. 159
The new NYSE rules also require companies to disclose how
shareholders may go about communicating with the company's inde-
pendent directors. 160  So that shareholders can "make their concerns
Under the NYSE and Nasdaq Listing Rules, foreign private companies can follow home
country practices in lieu of applicable listing standards, but must disclose any significant ways
in which their corporate governance practices differ from those followed by domestic compa-
nies. See NYSE Manual, supra note 153, § 303A-11; NASD Rules, supra note 153, §
4350(a).
154. Nominating Committee Rule, supra note 3, 68 Fed. Reg. at 69,210. While the
NYSE standards include a requirement that listed companies have an independent nominating
committee (NYSE Manual, supra note 153, § 303A.04(a)), the Nasdaq standards provide that
the nomination of directors may, alternatively, be determined by a majority of the independ-
ent directors (NASD Rules, supra note 153, 4350(c)(4)(A)).
155. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 88. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act;
NYSE Manual, supra note 152, §§ 303A.01-.02, 303A.05(a), 303A.06-.07; NYSE and
Nasdaq Listing Rules, supra note 152.
156. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 88; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. at
775-77; NYSE Manual, supra note 153, § 303A.06.
157. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 88-89; see also NYSE Manual, supra note
152, §§ 303A.04(b), 303A.05(b), 303A.07(c), 303A.09-.10 (requiring companies listed on the
NYSE to adopt and disclose a code of business conduct and ethics, corporate governance
guidelines, and charters for nominating, compensation and audit committees); NYSE and
Nasdaq Listing Rules, supra note 152, at 64,158 (requiring public audit, compensation and
nominating committees to adopt written charters).
158. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 89; see also NYSE Manual, supra note 152, §
303A.03; NYSE and Nasdaq Listing Rules, supra note 152, at 64,158.
159. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 89; see also NYSE Manual, supra note 152, §
303A. 10; NYSE and Nasdaq Listing Rules, supra note 152, at 64,159.
160. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 89; see also NYSE Manual, supra note 152, §
303A.03; NYSE and Nasdaq Listing Rules, supra note 152, at 64,158.
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known to non-management directors," the company must provide a
method for the shareholder to "communicate directly and confiden-
tially with the presiding director... or with non-management direc-
tors as a group.' 16'
3. New Rule Requiring Disclosure of Nominating Committee
Functions and Communication Between Security Holders
and Boards of Directors
While the NYSE and Nasdaq Listing Rules demonstrated the im-
portance of the nominating committee and its processes and repre-
sented a "strengthening of the role and independence of the nominat-
ing committee, they [did] not require nominating committees to
consider security holder nominees" or companies to make extensive
disclosure regarding the operations of the committee.' 62 Nor did they
provide specific or detailed disclosure requirements regarding the
method by which security holders could communicate their concerns
to non-management directors. 163
To close these gaps, on November 24, 2003, the SEC approved
new proxy statement disclosure rules concerning the role of nominat-
ing committees and shareholders' ability to communicate with boards
of directors." While the new standards do not mandate any particular
action by a company or its board, they require additional disclosure
intended to make the operations of a company's board more transpar-
ent to investors and new disclosure "concerning the means, if any, by
which security holders may communicate with directors. ' 165 The "en-
hanced disclosure is intended to provide security holders with addi-
tional, specific information" by which to evaluate a board and its
161. See Nominating Committee Rule, supra note 3, 68 Fed. Reg. at 69,210; see also
NYSE Manual, supra note 152, § 303A.03. The SEC saw this shareholder communication
device as analogous to the listing standard that requires that "[elach audit committee ... es-
tablish procedures for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints regarding accounting,
internal accounting controls or auditing matters, including procedures for the confidential,
anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable ac-
counting or auditing matters." Nominating Committee Rule, supra note 3, 68 Fed. Reg. at
69,210 (quoting Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.1OA-3(b)(3) (2003)).
162. Nominating Committee Rule, supra note 3, 68 Fed. Reg. at 69,210.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 69,221-22. The new rules became effective January 1, 2004, and the new
disclosure requirements apply to proxy or information statements sent to security holders after
January 1, 2004, and to Forms 10-Q and 10-K for periods ending after January 1, 204.
Id. at 69,204. Note, however, that foreign private issuers are exempt from this rule and the
proxy rules generally, pursuant to the provisions of Exchange Act Rule 3a 12-3, 17 C.F.R. §
240.3a12-3 (2004).
165. Nominating Committee Rule, supra note 3, 68 Fed. Reg. at 69,204.
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nominating committee, and enhanced "transparency of the nomination
process will make that process more understandable to security hold-
ers.",166
a. Nominating Committee Function Disclosure
In the past, public companies were required to disclose in their
annual meeting proxy statements whether they had a nominating
committee and, if so, its function, the names of its members and the
number of meetings it held, whether it would consider nominees rec-
ommended by security holders, and how such recommendations
should be submitted.1
67
The new Nominating Committee Rule significantly expands the
disclosures relating to the director nomination process. A company is
now also required to: make the nominating committee's charter pub-
licly available, disclose whether the nominating committee members
meet SRO independence requirements, disclose whether the commit-
tee has a policy regarding considering nominees recommended by
shareholders, describe the minimum qualifications for nominees rec-
ommended by the committee, describe the qualities and skills that the
nominating committee believes are necessary or desirable for board
members, describe the nominating committee's process for identifying
and evaluating candidates and whether fees are paid in connection
therewith, disclose who recommended the nominee, and disclose the
identity of any candidate nominated by a holder of more than five per-
cent of the voting common stock, regardless of whether the nominat-
ing committee chose to nominate that candidate. 68 Companies must
also disclose any material changes to the procedures by which share-
holders may recommend director nominees to the board, including the
adoption of any such procedure, in their Form 1O-Q or Form 10-K re-
ports filed with the SEC. 169
While the new requirements mandate only disclosure aimed at
making the nominating process more transparent to shareholders and
166. Id. at 69,205.
167. See id. at 69,205 n.26 (citing Exchange Act Release No. 34-15384, 43 Fed. Reg.
58,522 (Dec. 6, 1978) (initially adopting the nominating committee disclosure standards to
provide shareholders with information to assist in more informed assessment of the structure,
composition and functioning of an issuer's board)); see also Schedule 14A, Item 7(d)(1)-(2),
of the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2003) (amended Dec. 11, 2003) (setting forth
the required proxy statement disclosure).
168. See Schedule 14A, Item 7(d)(1)-(2), of the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101
(2004).
169. See Nominating Committee Rule, supra note 3, 68 Fed. Reg. at 69,212.
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do not directly impose any new requirements on how a company con-
ducts its director nomination process, practitioners posit that the new
disclosure will indirectly cause companies to change how they recruit
and elect their directors. 70
b. Communications Between Security Holders and Directors
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the subsequent SEC and SRO rules
have created new opportunities for shareholders to communicate with
public company directors.17' The Nominating Committee Rule seeks
to accomplish that goal through enhanced transparency of board op-
erations and improved security holder understanding of the communi-
cation process.
To that end, this rule requires companies to provide new disclo-
sure with regard to the process by which a security holder can com-
municate with board members.'72 The required disclosure includes:
whether the company provides a process for security holders to send
communications to the board, and if so, a description of the manner in
which those communications can be sent; the process for determining
which, if not all, communications are relayed to board members; a de-
scription of the company's policy, if any, regarding directors' atten-
dance at annual meetings; and a statement of the number who attended
the prior year's annual meeting.'73
In lieu of providing this proxy statement disclosure, the rule al-
lows the shareholder communication disclosure to be posted on the
company's website and a reference to be made in the proxy statement
to the applicable website where the information can be found. 74
Armed now with the ability to communicate with directors and a bet-
ter understanding of the inner workings of the boardroom, the SEC
hopes security holders will be empowered.
Despite the scramble public companies are currently undergoing
to comply with the new requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
170. See, e.g., Morrison & Foerster LLP, New Proxy Statement Disclosures Regarding
Director Nomination Process and Communications Between Shareholders and Boards of Di-
rectors, Legal Updates, at http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update 1130.html (Dec.
2003); see also Hannah L. Thompson & Gregory A. Wiessner, Public Companies Must Re-
spond to New SEC Disclosure Requirements Regarding Nominating Committee Functions
and Communications with Directors, MONDAQ, Feb. 23, 2004 (recommending that public
companies review their director nomination and shareholder communications policies and
procedures in light of the Proposed Rule).
171. Morrison & Foerster, supra note 170.
172. See Nominating Committee Rule, supra note 3, 68 Fed. Reg. at 69,210.
173. Id. at 69,210-11.
174. Id. at69,211.
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2002, the new NYSE and Nasdaq Listing Rules, and the new SEC
Nominating Committee Rule, the regulatory rulemaking fervor seems
not yet complete. Yet another new rule-the SEC's Security Holder
Director Nominations Rule-has been proposed, and that rule is the
primary focus of this article.
II. PROPOSED RULE 14A-1 1-SECURITY HOLDER DIRECTOR
NOMINATIONS
The SEC responded to the recent corporate scandals and excesses
that occurred, despite the stewardship of those companies' boards of
directors, by questioning the desirability of the directors that held
those critical positions of trust and confidence. In an attempt to give
shareholders a more powerful say in who those persons are and ensure
director responsiveness to the shareholders they serve, the SEC is con-
templating allowing shareholders of a public company to directly par-
ticipate in the director nomination process by allowing them to bypass
the nominating committee, nominate their choice of directors, and
have those nominations included in the company's proxy materials in
certain instances. 7 5 The proposed Security Holder Director Nomina-
tions Rule (Rule 14a-l 1) was published for comment in October
2003176 and is still in the proposal stage at this writing. If adopted in
its present form, Rule 14a-1 1 promises to create a new paradigm that
will change the way directors of a public company can be nominated
for election. But will this new paradigm really protect investors?
A. Current Director Nominations and Elections
The federal securities laws supplement shareholder voting rights
under state corporate law, as well as regulate communication among
shareholders and between a corporation and its shareholders.' As a
practical matter, security holders have the opportunity to vote their
proxy only for those candidates nominated by the company. 78 Fur-
ther, because many companies elect their directors by a plurality
rather than a majority of votes, candidates can be elected regardless of
the number of "withhold" votes they receive or whether they receive a
175. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,787, 60,819.
176. See id. at 60,784.
177. Paredes, supra note 85, at 497 & n.9. The proxy rules require extensive disclosure
relating to the solicitation of proxies. Id. For an overview of the proxy rules, see generally
LoUis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 488-561 (4th ed.
2001).
178. Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,786.
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majority of the votes cast.179 Critics of the current director nomination
process contend that the proxy process is ineffective and amounts to a
"mere formality or 'rubber stamp' of the board's choices presented in
the company's proxy materials."' I ° A security holder or group of se-
curity holders dissatisfied with the current directors must generally
undertake a time-consuming and personally expensive proxy contest
to put their nominees before the company's security holders for a
vote.'8' Critics also argue that even though security holders can rec-
ommend a candidate, such recommendations are rarely effective, and
it can be difficult to gain access to members of the board and their
committees. 82
B. Shareholder Proposals Under Rule 14a-8
Existing securities laws provide a mechanism by which share-
holders may, in certain circumstances, submit proposals to be included
in a company's proxy statement. 3 However, these laws do not pro-
vide a mechanism for shareholders to nominate a candidate for direc-
tor. Under Rule 14a-8, any shareholder that has continuously held
$2,000 in market value or 1% of the company's voting securities for at
least one year can submit a shareholder proposal to be included in the
issuer's proxy statement and form of proxy."s However, Rule 14a-
8(i)(8) allows the company to exclude a security holder proposal from
its proxy statement if the proposal "relates to an election for member-
ship on the company's board of directors or analogous governing
body." 185
179. See id. at 60,786. "Under plurality voting, the candidate with the greatest number of
votes is elected; therefore, in an election in which there are the same number of nominees as
there are board positions open, each nominee receiving even a single vote will be elected, re-
gardless of the number of votes 'withheld' from a candidate." Id. at n.52.
180. See id. at 60,786.
181. See id.
182. See id.; see also supra notes 161-174 and accompanying text for discussion of the
newly-adopted SEC rule requiring proxy statement disclosure of nominating committee func-
tions and methods by which security holders may now communicate with a company's direc-
tors.
183. See generally Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2004). For exam-
ple, a shareholder may want to propose that the company stop doing business in a particular
foreign country, that the company adopt an anti-discrimination employment policy, or that it
redeem a poison pill or expense its management stock options. Paredes, supra note 85, at 497
& n.10. For an overview of the shareholder proposal process, see generally Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 177, at 510-33.
184. Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(l).
185. Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(8), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8). Election of directors is
one of the thirteen substantive bases for exclusion allowed by the rule. Id.
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Rule 14a-8 attempts to balance the costs to the company with the
benefits to the company and its shareholders, by including modest se-
curity holder eligibility standards, limitations on the number and types
of proposals, and limitations on the number of words that the company
is required to include as a discussion of the security holder proposal. 8 6
The rule interacts with state law by permitting a company to exclude
any proposal that would violate state law if implemented. 87
C. The Proposed Rule
The genesis of both the Nominating Committee Rule and the Pro-
posed Rule is the July 15, 2003, SEC Staff Report undertaken at the
direction of the Commission on April 14, 2003.188 The Commission
directed the Division of Corporation Finance to review the proxy rules
and the procedures for election of directors to formulate possible
changes regarding "shareholder proposals, the nomination process,
elections of directors, the solicitation of proxies for director elections,
contests for corporate control, and the disclosure and other require-
ments imposed on large shareholders and groups of shareholders."18 9
The report identified three particular areas of concern related to the
election of corporate directors: (a) more robust disclosure was needed
regarding nominating committees and the nomination process, (b) dis-
closure was needed regarding the process by which shareholders could
communicate with board members, and (c) "conditional" access to a
186. Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,788.
187. See Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(1)-(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(l)-(2).
188. See Press Release No. 2003-46, SEC, Commission to Review Current Proxy Rules
and Regulations to Improve Corporate Democracy (Apr. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-46.htm. The Commission's review was prompted, in
part, in reaction to the case of a large pension plan consortium that unsuccessfully appealed its
proxy proposal to the Commission. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees' Pension Plan (AFSCME) had submitted a shareholder proposal to Citigroup, Inc.
that called for Citigroup to permit shareholders or groups of shareholders holding 3% or more
of the company's stock to nominate candidates for director in the company's proxy material.
Id. After a review of the request from Citigroup, the Division of Corporation Finance deter-
mined that existing Rule 14a-8 did not require Citigroup to include the shareholder proposal
in its proxy materials. Id. Rather than review the staff s determination, the Commission
unanimously voted to let it stand, noting, "The current rules concerning shareholder proposals
and director elections are clear and we are enforcing them as such." Id. (quoting Commission
Chairman William Donaldson). Nevertheless, the Commission decided to order a thorough
review of the proxy rules "to ensure they were serving the best interests of today's investors,
while . . fostering sound corporate governance and transparent business practices." Id.; see
also Staff Report, supra note 2, at 1.
189. See Press Release, supra note 189.
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company's proxy materials was needed so shareholders could nomi-
nate director candidates.' 90
While the Nominating Committee Rule' 9' was adopted, the SEC
staff's second rule, Security Holder Director Nominations (Proposed
Rule), 9 2 which allows shareholders direct access to a company's
proxy materials, has proven significantly more controversial. The
SEC first published the Proposed Rule for public comment on October
14, 2003, and in response received over 12,000 initial comment letters
from individuals, institutions, academia, and corporations, and several
thousand additional letters.1' 3 Recognizing the controversial nature
and uncertainties surrounding the new rule, the SEC has continued to
contemplate the rule and its effects, and commentators continue to
urge the SEC to move on the proposal. 19'
1. Shareholder Nominations
The SEC's stated primary objective of the Proposed Rule is "to
improve the ability of security holders to participate meaningfully in
the nomination and election of directors.., without unduly burdening
190. See Staff Report, supra note 2, at 33.
191. See Nominating Committee Rule, supra note 3.
192. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7.
193. Comments received by the SEC on the Proposed Rule can be found at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903.shtml (last modified Mar. 21, 2005). A summary
of the comment letters can be found at http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/s71903summary.htm
(prepared Mar. 5, 2004).
194. Citing his concern that "the devil is in the details," Commissioner Atkins noted that
the Proposed Rule is unique in that almost one-half of it consists of questions regarding im-
plementation to which the SEC does not have detailed answers. Laura S. Pruitt, SEC Consid-
ers Requiring Inclusion of Shareholder Nominees for Director in Company Proxy Materials,
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE, Nov. 2003, WL 7 No. 6
GLWSLAW 25 (reporting various comments and views of the Commissioners expressed at
the October 8, 2003, open Commission meeting at which the proposal was discussed).
Acknowledging the controversy surrounding the proposal, the SEC held a full-day "roundta-
ble" discussion on March 10, 2004, with representatives of public companies, investor groups,
and members of the legal and academic communities to discuss the Proposed Rule. A brief-
ing paper outlining issues and questions for discussion at the roundtable is available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/dir-nom-briefing.htm (Feb. 25, 2004). An un-
official transcript of the meeting is available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-
nominations/transcript03102004.txt, and an archived webcast of the meeting can be accessed
at http://www.connectlive.com/events/secnominations (Mar. 10, 2004). Selected statements
of roundtable participants are available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-noinations.htm.
While the SEC stated it would accept additional comment letters through March 31, 2004, it
received several thousand additional letters and still continues to receive and post them on its
website, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903.shtml, and a supplemental
summary prepared May 25, 2004 for later letters is available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/proposedarchive/proposed2003.shtml (last modified Jan. 4, 2005).
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companies.. . where... the proxy process may be ineffective."'' 95
Once the rule is triggered, a company would be required to include in-
formation regarding a security holder "independent" nominee for elec-
tion as a director in the company's proxy materials for its annual
meeting of security holders, where (a) state law establishes or does not
restrict a shareholder's right to nominate a candidate, and (b) the pro-
cedure is applicable to a particular company. 196
a. State Law
The security holder nomination procedure would be available
unless the state law under which a company was incorporated prohib-
ited the security holders from nominating a candidate or candidates for
election as a director. 9 However, if state law permits a company in-
corporated in that state to prohibit shareholder nominations by includ-
ing such a provision in its articles of incorporation and bylaws, any
company that does so would make the Proposed Rule effectively un-
available to its security holders. 19
b. Applicability
The Proposed Rule would apply to all companies that are subject
to Exchange Act proxy rules, including investment companies regis-
tered under Section 8 of the Investment Company Act; however, for-
eign private issuers would be exempt.199 The Proposed Rule asked for
comment on whether it should be applicable at first only to "acceler-
ated filers," 2" and phased in later as to all other companies.2"' While
the Commission expressed concern with avoiding a disproportionate
195. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,816.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 60,787. This provision is set forth in the Proposed Rule at 14a-1 l(a)(1).
Id. at 60,819.
198. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,788.
199. See id. at 60,787-88 & n.59. Foreign private issuers are exempt from the SEC's
proxy rules under Exchange Act Rule 3a12-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3. The application of the
Proposed Rule to investment companies is outside the scope of this article.
200. An "accelerated filer" is a domestic reporting company that has a public float of at
least $75 million, has been subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Exchange Act for at least 12 calendar months, has previously filed at least one annual re-
port under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, and is not eligible to use Exchange
Act Forms 10-QSB and 10-KSB. Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,788. Accelerated filers
are subject to shortened deadlines for filing their Forms I 0-Q and 10-K, and remain such until
they become eligible to use Forms 10-QSB and I0-KSB for their quarterly and annual reports.
Id.
201. See id.
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regulation burden on smaller companies, it found that more interest in
the proxy process was concentrated on the universe of companies that
were accelerated filers, which might warrant a two-step phase-in ap-
proach.2 °2
2. Triggering Events
The Proposed Rule would be triggered when either of two events
have occurred, which the SEC points to as "evidence of ineffective-
ness or security holder dissatisfaction with a company's proxy proc-
ess" because it has failed to permit security holder views to be ade-
quately taken into account. 203  A nomination procedure triggering
event would be deemed to have occurred when (a) at least one of the
company's nominees for director receives "withhold" votes2°4 from
more than 35% of the votes cast at an annual meeting at which direc-
tors were elected,20 5 or (b) a shareholder proposal pursuant to Rule
14a-8 to activate the shareholder "direct access" nomination proce-
dure in Proposed Rule 14a- 11 is (i) submitted for a vote of security
holders at an annual meeting of security holders by a security holder
or group of security holders that held more than 1% of the company's
securities entitled to vote on the proposal for at least one year,206 and
(ii) approved by a majority of votes cast at the meeting. 207 The nomi-
202. See id. Of the 266 companies that submitted no-action letters to the SEC during the
2002-2003 proxy season regarding their intention to exclude a security holder proposal under
Rule 14a-8, only 26 were not accelerated filers. Id. Of the 14,484 companies that file peri-
odic reports under the Exchange Act, the SEC estimates approximately 3,159 are accelerated
filers. Id. "Therefore, while 78% of reporting companies are not 'accelerated filers,' less
than 10% of the companies involved in the security holder proposal process at the [SEC] are
not 'accelerated filers."' Id.
203. See id. at 60,789-90.
204. Proxy rules allow a shareholder to vote for, against, or abstain on most proposals
other than in the election of directors. Id. at 60,789 n.72. "Because of plurality voting, in the
election of directors security holders may vote for or withhold authority to vote for each
nominee . I..." d
205. This trigger would not, however, apply in the case of a contested election under Ex-
change Act Rule 14a-12(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-12(c), or in an election to which the pro-
posed security holder nomination procedure under Rule 14a- I1 applies. Proposed Rule, supra
note 7, at 60,789.
206. The Proposed Rule also includes an accompanying amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
clarifying that a company may not rely on the 14a-8(i)(8) exclusion for proposals relating to
the election of directors in order to exclude a proposal to activate the direct access procedure
proposed by Rule 14a-l 1. Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,790. The Commission reiter-
ated that it was "not reviewing or revising [its] position ... regarding the [excludability un-
der] Rule 14a-8(i)(8) [of] security holder proposals that would have the effect of creating a
security holder nomination procedure, other than a direct access proposal." Id. at n.74.
207. See id. at 60,789-90. "Only'votes for and against the proposal would be included,"
similar to the calculation under Rule 14a-8. Id. at n.75.
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nation procedure would then remain operative for the two annual
meetings following the triggering event.2"8
This process creates a two-step, two-year procedure that would be
triggered in only a limited number of companies.2" The triggering
event must first occur in year one, and the shareholder nomination
right springing from that trigger is then applicable to the proxy mate-
rials for the following two years.210 The occurrence of a nomination
triggering event would require disclosure in a company's Form 10-Q
or 10-K. 11
While the Proposed Rule included only two triggers, the 35%
"withhold" votes for a company's director nominee or approval of a
direct access proposal, the Proposed Rule seeks comment on a third
possible trigger.212 The SEC is also considering the failure of a com-
pany to implement a previously approved shareholder proposal sub-
mitted under Rule 14a-8, 113 other than a proposal for shareholder di-
rect access, as evidence of ineffectiveness of or security holder
dissatisfaction with a company's proxy process.1
3. Eligibility Requirements
a. Nominating Security Holder Eligibility
A security holder seeking to invoke the direct access rules must
meet certain eligibility requirements. The Proposed Rule requires that
the shareholder or group of shareholders (a) "[b]eneficially own, ei-
ther individually or in the aggregate, more than five percent of the
company's securities that are eligible to vote for the election of direc-
208. See id. at 60,789.
209. See id. at 60,789-91. Based on a sample of 2,227 director elections over the past
two years, the SEC estimated that "1.1% of companies had total withhold votes in excess of
35% of the votes cast." Id. at 60,790. In addition, of publicly traded companies, the SEC es-
timated that 84% have at least one institutional shareholder that has maintained ownership of
at least 1% of the shares outstanding for one year. Id. Even so, submission of security holder
proposals by large holders is rare, based on a review of a sample of 237 security holder pro-
posals in 2002, where only three were found to have been submitted by a holder of more than
1% of the shares outstanding, and all three of those were submitted by the same security
holder. Id. at 60,791.
210. Id. at 60,789-91.
211. Id. at 60,793.
212. See id. at 60,791.
213. Shareholder proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8 may be "precatory" rather than
mandatory proposals, i.e., only requesting but not requiring board action, and so even though
a proposal receives approval of more than 50% of the votes cast, implementation may never-
theless remain at the discretion of the board. See id.
214. See id.
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tors at the next annual meeting," (b) have held those securities con-
tinuously for a minimum of two years at the date of the nomination, 15
(c) "intend to continue to [hold] those securities through the date of
the annual meeting, '216 (d) be eligible "to report beneficial ownership
[of the securities] on Exchange Act Schedule 13G, rather than Ex-
change Act Schedule 13D, ' 217 and (e) "[h]ave filed an Exchange Act
Schedule 13G or an amendment[] reporting beneficial ownership as a
passive or institutional investor (or group).21 8
Shareholders are allowed to aggregate their holdings to meet the
five percent minimum threshold to nominate a director candidate, and
thereafter act as a concerted group to solicit for that nominee under the
Proposed Rule, so long as they identify themselves and qualify to re-
port as a Schedule 13G filer. 219 Their Schedule 13G filing would de-
clare their intentions to form a group solely for purposes of solicita-
tion of their director nominee, but to not otherwise seek to effect
control. 2 1 If the shareholders do not qualify to use Schedule 13G (for
instance, if they intended to effect control over the company), they
would not be permitted to act as a group for purposes of the Proposed
Rule. 221
b. Nominee Eligibility
In addition to eligibility requirements for the nominating share-
holder, the candidates that are nominated must also meet specified eli-
gibility requirements. Those requirements include (a) the nomination
is consistent with applicable laws and regulations,2 2 (b) the nominee
has no "prohibited relationships, ' 223 and (c) the nominee is "independ-
ent. 224
A company would not be required to include a security nominee if
the nominee's candidacy, or board membership if elected, would vio-
late state or federal law or SRO rules (other than SRO rules regarding
215. See id. at 60,794; Exchange Act Rule 14a-l l(b)(l)-(2).
216. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,794; Exchange Act Rule 14a-1 (b)(2).
217. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,794; Exchange Act Rule 14a-1 (b)(3).
218. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,794; Exchange Act Rule 14a- I(b)(4).
219. See Exchange Act Rule 14a-I l(b)(l)-(4); see infra Part 11, Section D(1), and the ac-
companying notes, for a further discussion of Schedules 13D and 13G as they relate to the
Proposed Rule.
220. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,797.
221. Id. Existing Exchange Act Rule 14a-12(c) regarding contested elections of directors
would instead apply. Id.
222. See id. at 60,795; Exchange Act Rule 14a-1 l(a)(3)(i).
223. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,795-96.
224. See id. at 60,796.
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independence of directors).2 5 Because compliance with SRO inde-
pendence standards can depend on the overall make-up of a board, the
SEC excluded independence standards as a separate requirement;
however, the nominating security holder or group must make a repre-
sentation to the company that the nominee satisfies the existing SRO
standard for independence.226
While the SEC acknowledged the potential "disruptive effect a
security holder nomination procedure could have on board dynamics
and board operation," and the concerns related to potential for "special
interest" or "single issue" directors that would advance the interests of
the nominating shareholder over the interests of all shareholders, it
found the Proposed'Rule would allow security holders to nominate
candidates the shareholders believe are more qualified than those put
forward by the nominating committee or the board.227 To compensate
for this concern, however, the Proposed Rule prohibits a nominee
from having certain specified relationships with the nominating secu-
rity holder or group, which are essentially the same as those that cur-
rently exist under the proxy rules.228 To be considered independent,
the nominee must meet the following criteria: (a) the nominee is not
the security holder or a member of the nominating security holder
group or an immediate family member of such person, (b) the nomi-
nee has not been an employee of the security holder or group during
the current or preceding calendar year, (c) the nominee has not been a
consultant to the security holder or group during the current or preced-
ing calendar year, (d) the nominee is not an executive officer or direc-
tor of the security holder or group or an affiliate of such person, and
(e) the nominee does not control the security holder or group.229
To balance the concerns regarding the effect the nomination pro-
cedure may have on a company's compliance with its "independent"
director requirement and that nominating security holders may act
"merely as a surrogate for the company," against the potential benefits
of the direct access procedure, the Proposed Rule requires the nomi-
nating security holder or group to represent that (a) the nominee satis-
fies the SRO standards regarding director independence (except where
a SRO rule requires a subjective determination by the board) and (b)
"[n]either the nominee nor the nominating security holder (or any
225. See id. at 60,795; Exchange Act Rule 14a-I I(a)(4).
226. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,795; Exchange Act Rule 14a-I I(c)(4).
227. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,795.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 60,795-96.
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member of the nominating security holder group, if applicable) has a
direct or indirect agreement with the company regarding the nomina-
tion of this nominee. 23°
4. Limitation on Nominations
The company may limit the number of security holder nominees
included in its proxy materials according to the size of its board. It
would be required to include one nominee if its board is eight or
fewer, two nominees if the board is greater than eight and less than
twenty, and three if the board size is twenty or more.23' For classified
or "staggered" boards where the term of a director's office extends
past the date of the meeting of security holders for which the company
is then soliciting proxies, the company would not be required to in-
clude security holder nominees if doing so would cause the total num-
ber of directors serving on the board that were elected as security
holder nominees to exceed the previously-mentioned limits. 32
If more security holder nominees are nominated than the allowed
maximum according to board size, the nominees of the security holder
with the highest ownership percentages are selected to be included in
the proxy statement.233  The nominee or nominees of the security
holder or group with the largest beneficial ownership, as reported on
its Schedule 13G at the time of the nomination, would be included by
the company, up to the total number required to be included.2"
5. Notice
The nominating security holder would be required to give notice
to the company of its intent to require that the company include that
security holder's nominee in the company's proxy material no later
than eighty days before the date the company mails its proxy materials
for the annual meeting, and the rule sets out the content of that notice,
which includes representations required by the rule, a copy of the
nominating security holder or group's Schedule 13G, and the methods
by which it intends to solicit security holders, including any web site
230. See id. at 60,796.
231. See id. at 60,797. Based on a sample of 1,439 public companies in 2002, the median
board size was nine, with boards ranging in size from four to twenty-four. Id. at n. 114. Ap-
proximately 42% of boards in the sample had eight or fewer directors, 58% had between nine
and nineteen directors, and less than 1% had twenty or more directors. Id.
232. See id. at 60,797-98.
233. See id. at 60,798.
234. See id. at 60,797; Exchange Act Rule 14a-l 1(d)(3).
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address on which the nominating security holder or group may publish
soliciting materials.2 13  A copy of the notice must be filed with the
Commission and would be deemed soliciting material of the nominat-
ing security holder subject to Exchange Act Rule 14a-9.236
The company must notify the security holder or group of its de-
termination whether or not to include the nominee in its proxy mate-
rial no less than thirty calendar days before the date the company's
proxy statement is released.237
6. Proxy Materials
If a security holder nominee will be included in the company
proxy materials, the company must include the web site address at
which the security holder or group intends to solicit in favor of its
nominee, in addition to the information regarding the nominee that is
required.238 If the company chooses to include a statement supporting
company nominees and/or opposing the nominating security holder
nominees, other than a mere recommendation to vote in favor of or
withhold votes from specified candidates, the nominating security
holder must be given the same opportunity to include a statement of
support for its nominee or nominees, limited to 500 words.239 If the
company chooses not to make any statement other than a recommen-
dation, the company is not required to include the nominating security
holder's supporting statement. 4° In either case, both the company and
the nominating security holder are allowed to solicit in favor of their
nominees outside of the proxy statement (e.g., on a designated web
site), provided that such solicitations otherwise comply with applica-
ble proxy rules. 241
235. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,798-99.
236. See id. at 60,799. Rule 14a-9 prohibits false or misleading statements in connection
with solicitation of proxies. Exchange Act Rule l4a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2004).
237. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,801.
238. See id.
239. See id. The company is not liable for false or misleading statements included in ei-
ther the security holder notice to the company or any security holder supporting statement that
the company is required to include in its proxy materials, nor would either be considered in-
corporated by reference into any of the company's filings under the Securities Act or the Ex-
change Act, unless the company affirmatively incorporates such information. See id. at
60,802; Exchange Act Rule 14a-I I(e).
240. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,800.
241. See id.
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7. Solicitation Activities
Because security holders wishing to form a group to meet the
minimum five percent ownership threshold to nominate a director
candidate may be required to engage in communications with other
security holders that might otherwise be deemed "solicitations" under
the proxy rules, the Proposed Rule includes a limited exemption in or-
der to facilitate these types of communications.242 To qualify for this
exemption, the security holder would have two options: (a) the com-
munications are made to no more than thirty persons, or alternatively
(b) the communications can be made to an unlimited number of secu-
rity holders, provided the communication is limited in content and
filed with the Commission. 243 The content is limited to a statement of
the security holder's intent to form a group in order to nominate a di-
rector, the percentage beneficially owned by the security holder or
group, and the means by which security holders can contact the solic-
iting party. 24 Solicitation communications that are aimed at forming a
nominating security holder group and that comply with the foregoing
requirements would generally be exempt from the other proxy solici-
tation rules.
245
Once security holder groups are formed and additional solicitation
activities are conducted by or on behalf of a nominating security
holder or group in support of its nominee, those activities would like-
wise be exempt from the other proxy solicitation rules, 244 so long as:
(a) the soliciting party does not seek, directly or indirectly, the power
to act as proxy, (b) each written communication includes (i) the iden-
tity of the nominating security holder or group and a description of his
or her interests and (ii) a prominent legend advising security holders
that a security holder nominee is or will be included in the company's
proxy statement and advising them to read the proxy statement when
it becomes available, and (c) any soliciting material sent to security
holders is filed with the Commission.2 47
242. See id. at 60,803; Exchange Act Rule 14a-I I(f)(1).
243. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,803.
244. See id.
245. See id. These types of soliciting activities would be exempt from Exchange Act
Rules 14a-3 to 14a-6(o), 14a-8, 14a-10, and 14a-12 to 14a-15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 to
240.14a-6(o), 240.14a-8, 240.14a-10, and 240.14a-12 to 240.14a-15 (2004). Id.
246. See supra note 245 for the applicable proxy rules from which these activities would
be exempted.
247. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,803.
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D. Related Rule Changes
1. 5% Holder-Schedule 13G
Under Exchange Act Rule 13d-l, 2 ' any person who is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than five percent of a class of
equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act
must report that ownership by filing an Exchange Act Schedule 13D
with the Commission.2 49 Certain exceptions to this requirement permit
security holders to report their ownership on Exchange Act Schedule
13G, if, for example, (a) the holder is one of a specified list of quali-
fied institutional investors who has acquired the securities in the ordi-
nary course of business and with neither the purpose nor the effect of
changing or influencing control of the company, or (b) the holder has
acquired the securities with neither the purpose nor the effect of
changing or influencing control of the company, and the holder is not
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of twenty percent or more
of the subject class of securities.250
The Proposed Rule relies heavily on the "passive investor" re-
quirement on which Schedule 13G eligibility is based.15 ' In order to
be eligible to invoke the nominating procedure, the security holder or
group must be eligible to report their ownership interests on Schedule
13G (rather than Schedule 13D), and the security holder or group
would be required to have filed the schedule by the date the nominat-
ing security holder or group submits its notice of intent to nominate a
director to the company. 252 The rule is premised on the SEC's belief
that passive investors which have acquired securities without the pur-
pose or effect of changing or influencing control of the company, or
qualified institutional investors which have acquired the securities in
the ordinary course of business, should not be viewed as changing
their intent simply by engaging in activities as part of a nominating
security holder group.25 3
To effect the functioning of the Proposed Rule, Exchange Act
Schedule 13G would also be amended to require security holders or
groups to certify in their original or amended filing that they have
owned at least the minimum five percent of securities for not less than
248. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-I (2005).
249. See id.
250. See, e.g., Exchange Act Rules 13d-l(b)-(c).
251. Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,805.
252. See id.
253. See id.
42
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss2/3
20051 THE SHAREHOLDER DIRECT ACCESS TEETER-TO17ER
two years, pursuant to Rule 14a-1 1.214 Upon termination of the nomi-
nating security holder group, a termination filing would be made.255
2. 10% Holders & Insiders-Section 16
Exchange Act Section 16 applies to every person that is the bene-
ficial owner of more than 10% of any class of equity securities regis-
tered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act (10% owners), and each
officer and director (collectively with 10% owners, referred to as in-
siders) of the issuer of such security.2 56 Section 16(a) requires insiders
to file initial reports with the Comniission to disclose their beneficial
ownership of equity securities of the issuer, and to file reports of
changes in such holdings. 257 Section 16(b) provides a private right of
action to recover from an insider any profit realized by that insider
from the purchase and sale of the issuer's equity securities effect in
any period of less than six months.258 Finally, Section 16(c) prohibits
an insider from selling any equity security of the issuer if the insider
does not own the security, or owns the security but does not deliver it
against the sale within a specified time period.259
The Proposed Rule would not compel a reassessment of 10%
beneficial owner status for purposes of Section 16 when security
holder groups form solely for the purpose of nominating a director
under Rule 14a-1 1.26° The rule is premised on the SEC's belief that
the actions of nominating security holder groups are fully disclosed,
they are not acting with a "control" purpose, and they do not have in-
sider status.26' Further, it would be a disincentive to using the Pro-
posed Rule if forming a nominating security holder group would sub-
ject the group members to Exchange Act Section 16 if the group
owned over 10% of the company's securities. 262
The Proposed Rule includes an amendment to Exchange Act Rule
16a-l(a)(1) to exclude nominating security holder groups from the
definition of a 10% owner for Section 16 purposes and to clarify that
nominating security holder groups would not be deemed to have a
254. See id. at 60,806.
255. See id. at 60,806.
256. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2004).
257. See id. § 78p(a).
258. See id. § 78p(b).
259. See id. § 78p(c).
260. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,807.
261. See id.
262. See id.
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control purpose or effect solely by virtue of group membership. 263
However, group members whose individual ownership exceeds 10%
will continue to be subject to Section 16, as will groups whose owner-
ship has the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of the
issuer.
E. A Look Back
The Proposed Rule is one of several instances where the SEC has
considered giving shareholders direct access to company proxy mate-
rials for the nomination process. As early as 1942, the Commission
solicited comments on a staff recommendation that "minority stock-
holders be given an opportunity to use the management's proxy mate-
rials in support of their own nominees for directorships," but the pro-
posal was dismissed with little explanation in the record.265 In 1977,
the Commission again considered the proposal during its broad review
of security holder communications, the corporate electoral process,
and corporate governance generally. 266 However, at the end of the
day, it simply required that companies state whether they had a nomi-
nating committee, and if so, whether the committee would consider
security holder recommendations.2 67
A later 1980 Staff Report to the Senate concluded that due to the
emerging concept of nominating committees, the Commission should
not propose or adopt a security holder nomination process at that time,
but instead recommended that the staff monitor the development of
nominating committees and their consideration of security holder rec-
ommendations.268 The Staff Report cautioned that if an insufficient
number of companies adopted nominating committees or if the re-
sponsiveness of the committees proved insufficient, the Commission
might want to reconsider action.269
Finally, in connection with sweeping 1992 proxy reforms, 27 ° "the
Commission noted 'the difficulty experienced by shareholders in gain-
ing a voice in determining the composition of the board,"' but con-
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 60,785 (citing Exchange Act Release No. 34-3347 (Dec. 18, 1942)).
266. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,785 (citing Exchange Act Release No. 34-
14970, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,945 (July 18, 1978) and Exchange Act Release No. 34-15384, 43 Fed.
Reg. 58,522 (Dec. 6, 1978)).
267. Id.
268. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,785.
269. See id.
270. See generally Release No. 34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992).
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cluded that such a proposal would represent a substantial change in
the Commission's rules which would essentially mandate a "universal
ballot" including both management nominees and independent candi-
dates for board seats. 271 Rather than mandating the universal ballot,
the Commission revised the proxy rules to allow security holders
seeking minority board representation to fill out a partial or "short
slate" with management nominees, making it easier to conduct an
election contest in a non-control context.272
F. A Look Forward
It seems clear the Proposed Rule, if adopted, will significantly re-
form the proxy rules and give shareholders more voice and control
over the constituency of the board of directors. Yet not so clear is
whether that increased voice and control will prevent the corporate
and accounting scandals of our recent past and actually lead to protec-
tion for all shareholders, or only for a select few.
III. PROTECTING SHAREHOLDERS
A. The Lesson of Selecting the "Right" Directors
Enron and its progeny taught us that irrespective of statutory or
common law fiduciary duties of care and loyalty owed by a com-
pany's directors, shareholders are wise to carefully consider those per-
sons that are ultimately selected as directors to perform the important
role of appointing management, determining management's compen-
sation, and reviewing and approving a company's major investments
and the operational decisions made by management. It may no longer
be a satisfactory practice to blindly rely on management and the in-
cumbent directors to identify and select qualified nominee directors,
and more shareholder input into the director selection process may in-
deed be the wiser course. While heightened fiduciary duties and true
independence are certainly good benchmarks, they can be hollow con-
cepts if a corporate scandal is allowed to go unchecked and a com-
pany's stock value is all but destroyed before the shareholders are
made aware of the problem. And we have seen how quickly this can
271. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,786.
272. See id. For example, if a shareholder wanted to nominate two candidates to a seven
member board, pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 14a-4(d), the holder would complete the man-
agement ballot to oppose two names, then disseminate and file a separate proxy statement and
proxy card, and include a vote for the five management nominees on the non-management
proxy card. Id.
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happen. Therefore, the call for increased shareholder voice into the
nomination and election of directors is certainly understandable.
Shareholders may be better protected by taking a more active and ear-
lier role in protecting their investments, and that protection may start
at the point of director selection and nomination.
B. Will Proposed Rule 14a-ll Be the Cure?
Increased shareholder voice may come at a cost to some share-
holders if it is not proven to effectively benefit all shareholders. Part
III of this article explores the impact of the Proposed Rule and
whether it will indeed result in the election of a board that will best
protect all shareholders. The article concludes that the rule is not
likely to result in better protection because, in addition to being
unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny, it will not provide a meaning-
ful new tool for shareholders. The thresholds, triggers and time peri-
ods are too great for the rule to be effective, and it will not produce
better boards. Instead, this article suggests that shareholders and
nominating committees are currently armed with the right tools, re-
cently provided by the new regulatory framework still "hot off the
presses," and can work together with these new tools toward their
common goals of increasing shareholder value and protecting inves-
tors.
C. Fundamental Opposing Views
Even opposing sides of the shareholder access proposal agree that
good corporate governance, better safeguards, and enhanced long-
term value of a company's stock are mutual penultimate goals. How-
ever, at the heart of the shareholder direct access proposal seem to be
fundamental opposing views of how to reach those goals: (a) in-
creased shareholder voice in the nominating process would improve
the director selection process, resulting in directors that are more re-
sponsive to shareholders, and that would in turn ensure the recent
round of corporate scandals will not reoccur, versus (b) truly inde-
pendent directors who operate under an umbrella of heightened corpo-
rate governance standards would be best able to protect and serve the
interests of all shareholders.
However, several questions arise from these opposing views and
seem as of yet unanswered. Does who nominates the director translate
into more independence? While independent directors are a central
tenet of our corporate governance system, does independence corre-
406 [Vol. 41
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late with being accountable to shareholders? And, while the share-
holder direct access proposal will indeed increase shareholder voice in
the selection of directors, does more voice translate into protection for
all shareholders? Or will that protection come at an unacceptably high
cost in terms of board distraction and dissention?
These questions will not likely be answered in the immediate fu-
ture. We have only recently adopted a new corporate governance
regulatory scheme, the most significant in more than a half a century,
and it needs some time to prove itself and whether these questions will
be answered. However, instead of giving the new scheme time, the
SEC proposes to add another rule on top of the many. Yet, assuming
it withstands judicial scrutiny, the shareholder direct access rule will
result in a proxy nomination process that is more disruptive and ex-
pensive and inner workings of the boardroom that are more adversar-
ial. Is this "good" for shareholders? While this type of proposal may
be appropriate for a minute number of the "worst" companies, as
structured it will apply to all of the more than 14,000 public compa-
nies, so it is appropriate to carefully consider its impact.
D. No Authority to Regulate Corporate Governance and Preempt
State Law
If adopted in its present form, the Proposed Rule will likely be ju-
dicially challenged because it appears to exceed the SEC's established
authority. It goes beyond regulating disclosure and into the area of
substantive corporate governance. Moreover, it effectively preempts
state law in an area of corporate governance traditionally regulated
exclusively by the states, without any clear authority to do so. Conse-
quently, there appears to be no precedent for the SEC to unilaterally
expand its authority to include substantive powers in the area of direc-
tor nominations.
1. Coexisting Federal and State Law Paradigms
A mix of federal and state law governs public companies. State
law has traditionally and exclusively regulated the area of director
elections.273 Through the company's charter documents, the company
273. The U.S. Supreme Court has said, "Corporations are creatures of state law, and in-
vestors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where fed-
eral law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders,
state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
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grants rights to its shareholders consistent with the laws of the state in
which it incorporates.274 And while over 50% of public companies are
incorporated in Delaware, known for its expertise on corporate law is-
sues, other states vie for the remaining corporate charter business and
are understandably sensitive to corporate governance issues and needs
when crafting their particular state corporate laws.
275
Under the Exchange Act, the SEC has broad federal authority to
mandate disclosure by public companies in their periodic reports,
proxy materials and other filings, for matters that are material to
shareholder voting, other decisions, and corporate governance mat-
ters.276  However, rules promulgated under the SEC's authority to
regulate the proxy solicitation process must be deemed "necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
277
2. Beyond SEC's Authority-The Critical Distinction Between
Mandating Disclosure Requirements and Regulating Corporate
Governance
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act limits the SEC's power to
promulgate rules to those that relate to disclosure and procedures con-
nected with the solicitation of proxies. While one view is that the
Proposed Rule merely mandates what material appears in a company's
proxy statement, it actually impacts who can nominate, how they
nominate, and who is eventually elected-actions that cross the line
from disclosure and move into the area of substantive corporate gov-
ernance. There is a significant distinction between mandating disclo-
sure and regulating the nomination process, and the seminal case of
Business Roundtable v. SEC278 has given guidance on this distinction.
First, some background may be helpful on several sources of the
SEC's rule-making authority. The SEC's power to promulgate rules
under the Exchange Act oftentimes translates into exchange listing
standards that are adopted to implement those rules. 279 The SEC must
274. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 83-84.
275. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88, at 553-55 (collecting data and considering
whether regulatory competition among the states serves to increase shareholder value).
276. See generally Exchange Act §§ 13-14, 15 U.S.C. § 78m-n (2004); see also Special
Study Group of Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar Associa-
tion Section of Business Law, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Cor-
porate Governance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487, 1529 (2002) (examining the role and authority of the
SROs and the SEC in matters of corporate governance, and recommending a proposal to de-
velop best practices guidelines and implement a "comply or explain" approach).
277. See Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (2004).
278. 905 F.2d406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
279. For a broad discussion of SEC authority relating to listing standards, see generally
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approve any new or amended listing standards adopted by the ex-
changes or Nasdaq. 2 ° The SEC's authority emanates from Sections
19(b) and (c) of the Exchange Act, and differs depending on whether
the standard is proposed by the SRO or the SEC is imposing the stan-
dard on the SRO.28' Under Section 19(b), listing standards that are
proposed by the SROs must be "consistent with the requirements" of
the Exchange Act applicable to theSROs, while under Section 19(c),
listing standards that are imposed by the SEC on the SRO must be
"necessary or appropriate... in furtherance of the purposes" of the
Exchange Act.282
The "consistency test" of Section 19(b) requires that SRO rules
may not "permit unfair discrimination between ... issuers. '"283 While
there has yet been no judicial consideration of the SEC's authority un-
der Section 19(b), Business Roundtable has interpreted the SEC's lack
of power to promulgate corporate governance listing standards under
Section 19(c). 284
In Business Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals abro-
gated SEC-adopted Exchange Act Rule 19c-4, which attempted to bar
the exchanges and Nasdaq from listing securities with certain dispa-
rate voting requirements, on the ground that it sought to "directly con-
trol the substantive allocation of powers among classes of sharehold-
ers" and therefore exceeded the SEC authority under Section 19.285
The court held the rule was not "'in furtherance of the purposes' of the
Exchange Act"2 86 and concluded that the SEC had stepped beyond
control over voting procedure and into the distribution of voting
power. 87 The court did not find expressly enumerated power for the
SEC to regulate this area of corporate governance, nor would it infer
any expanded power. The court found no congressional intent to per-
mit broad federal preemption over corporate governance standards,
nor the intent to create a comprehensive body of federal corporate law
Special Study Group, supra note 276, at 1487.
280. See Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2004).
281. Task Force on Shareholder Proposals of the Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities, Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association, Report on Proposed
Changes in Proxy Rules and Regulations Regarding Procedures for the Election of Corporate
Directors, 59 Bus. LAW. 109, 131 (2003) (report prepared in response to SEC's request for
comments concerning regulation of shareholder proposals and shareholder participation in the
director selection process).
282. Id. See Exchange Act § 19(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2004).
283. See Exchange Act § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2004).
284. Task Force on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 281, at 132.
285. 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
286. Id. at 417.
287. id. at 411.
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through mandated listing standards, which would impinge on the tra-
ditional state regulation of corporate law.288 While the SEC has not
sought to invoke Section 19(c) authority since Business Roundtable,
its powers of persuasion appear nonetheless effective in enlisting the
cooperation of SROs to coordinate amended listing standards.289
The Business Roundtable decision preceded the recent corporate
scandals that led Congress to adopt the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. When it
did so, Congress included in that Act express authority for the SEC to
promulgate rules in specific areas of corporate governance, which the
SEC and SROs have now done. However, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
did not contemplate or address the topic of director nominations. The
Act does not express Congress's intent to grant authority to the SEC in
this area, nor does the Proposed Rule cite Sarbanes-Oxley for its au-
thority, which further confirms that the SEC lacks express congres-
sional authority to regulate the area of director nominations.
Notably, the Proposed Rule is virtually silent on the basis for its
statutory authority and simply states "we believe that today's propos-
als further the goals of Section 14," and "the proposed procedure in-
volves disclosure and other requirements concerning proxy materi-
als."2" It also asserts "a similar underlying purpose as Exchange Act
Rule 14a-8" in that "the proposal would establish a procedure pursu-
ant to which a company would have to provide specified information
regarding [a shareholder] nomination in its proxy materials."2 9 Based
solely on these general statements and with no other basis for its au-
thority, the Proposed Rule states that it is authorized by "Sec-
tions 3(b), 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 23(a) and 36 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934" and similar provisions of the Investment Company Act
of 1940.292 However, the Exchange Act does not authorize the SEC to
288. See id. at 412-13. As examples of corporate governance matters which were re-
served to the state, the court cited "requirements for independent directors, independent audit
committees, shareholder quorums, shareholder approval for certain major corporate transac-
tions, and other major issues traditionally governed by state law." Id. at 412.
289. See Special Study Group, supra note 276, at 1526.
290. Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,786-87.
291. Id. at 60,788.
292. Id. at 60,816. However, under seminal case law, the SEC's assessment of its own
authority is not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). See, e.g., United Transp. Union-illinois Legisla-
tive Bd. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 169 F.3d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 1999) ("We have indeed held that
an administrative agency's determination about the scope of its own jurisdiction, 'a matter
within the peculiar expertise of the courts,' does not receive Chevron deference but is re-
viewed de novo.") (citing Midland Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 149
F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted) (Chevron deference "does not ex-
tend" to questions of an agency's jurisdiction)).
[Vol. 41410
50
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss2/3
2005] THE SHAREHOLDER DIRECT ACCESS TEETER-TOTTER 411
regulate the internal affairs of a corporation by setting the qualifica-
tions of directors who may be nominated or by giving shareholders
greater ability to change the makeup of the board. Therefore, the Pro-
posed Rule is outside the SEC's current scope of authority and likely
will not withstand a judicial challenge.
3. State Law Preemption
State corporate law governs the director nomination and election
process.2 93 The Proposed Rule seeks to regulate corporate governance
in a manner in which the U.S. Supreme Court has declared reserved to
the states.2 94 The SEC does not have the power to exercise unilateral
discretion to adopt regulations that preempt state laws.2 95 As Business
Roundtable tells us, "the SEC's assertion of authority directly invades
the 'firmly established' state jurisdiction over corporate governance
and shareholder voting."2 96 While the Proposed Rule specifies the
nomination right would only apply to companies whose charter docu-
ments do not prohibit its provisions, and to companies that are incor-
porated in states which allow its provisions, the shareholder direct ac-
cess rule essentially preempts state law in the area of director
nomination rights and voting processes by creating new federal prac-
tices that run counter to the concept of federalism. The SEC seems to
have acknowledged the potential state law preemption issue by asking
for comments on whether the Proposed Rule would conflict with state
law or SRO regulations.
Moreover, extending the rationale of Business Roundtable to the
Proposed Rule, there is no express congressional intent to allow the
SEC to preempt state corporate governance measures on who can
nominate directors or impose triggering events allowing a nomination
to be made, and what criteria that nominating shareholder must meet.
Just as Rule 19c-4 impermissibly sought to substantively control the
allocation of power between shareholders, the Proposed Rule will con-
trol, and actually grant, power to large shareholders to name a nomi-
nee and have the company pay for and distribute proxy materials pro-
moting that candidate, yet small shareholders will have no such power
293. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 211-12 (2004) (governing election of direc-
tors).
294. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (finding that estab-
lished state policies and laws govern the internal affairs of a corporation).
295. Id.
296. Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413 (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S.
69, 89 (1987)).
51
DeGaetano: The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-Totter: Will Increased Share
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2004
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
or right. This will go beyond state law rights and provide new and
different federal shareholder rights.297
Furthermore, it is important to note a distinction between the Pro-
posed Rule and Rule 14a-8. The latter requires certain shareholder
proposals be included in proxy materials, but even a shareholder pro-
posal that receives a majority vote is not required to be implemented,
because the board retains its state law power to determine in its discre-
tion and in the exercise of its business judgment whether the proposal
would be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.
Conversely, the Proposed Rule appears to require that the shareholder
nominee receiving the requisite vote have complied with the Proposed
Rule and satisfied its procedural requirements.2 9 This goes beyond
providing information to shareholders about what issues are to be
voted upon and instead dictates what action the corporation must take,
overriding the board's fiduciary duties to manage the company's busi-
ness and affairs as it determines is most proper.
4. Uneven Application
The Proposed Rule will discriminate among shareholders and has
the potential to result in dissent among them. It favors large share-
holders, to the detriment of small holders, by granting large share-
holders nominating rights that others do not have. Moreover, large
shareholders will have more leverage to coerce a company into ap-
peasing a holder's special interests in exchange for the holder with-
drawing a nominee or direct access proposal. Small shareholders have
no such rights or ability. Similar to the securities class action arena,
this rule positions large shareholders to be able to intimidate and co-
erce a company's management.
Just as cumulative voting and supermajority voting requirements
have fallen into disfavor,2" so should this rule-it gives certain
297. Query: Are we moving toward the concept of a "creature of federal law" here?
Canada has such a federal incorporation option, where firms can choose to incorporate either
in one of the provinces or federally. For discussion of the Canadian federal option, see gener-
ally Douglas Cumming & Jeffrey MacIntosh, The Role of lnterjurisdictional Competition in
Shaping Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 141 (2000).
298. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,800.
299. According to Investor Responsibility Research Center, only 9.2% of the S&P Super
1500 companies still have cumulative voting. Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Perspective on
Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors, 59 Bus. LAW. 95, 107 n.44 (2003) (citing
IRRC Corporate Governance Service 2003, BACKGROUND REPORT F: CONFIDENTIAL AND
CUMULATIVE VOTING (Jan. 2003)). Cumulative voting is mandatory in seven states; it is the
default provision unless the corporation opts out in fourteen states; and it is not allowed
unless the corporation opts in in twenty-nine states. Id. at 108 n.45. Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS), the leading provider of proxy voting and corporate governance services, rec-
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shares/shareholders more power than others in the selection and
nomination of directors.
E. Not a Meaningful Tool
Because of the nearly insurmountable obstacles the Proposed Rule
contains, it is not likely to improve the director selection process or
have a practical effect of protecting shareholders.
1. Thresholds and Triggers Are Too High to Be Effective
The five percent threshold to nominate a director is too high to be
effective. The United States stock market is fragmented and has a low
concentration of share ownership. Less than one-half of the compa-
nies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Ex-
change or Nasdaq markets have a single shareholder who could satisfy
the five percent ownership requirement."
The Proposed Rule's high threshold presumes that institutional
shareholders are not only willing to monitor the board and the indi-
vidual board members' performance, but that the institutions will be-
come activists when appropriate. However, they are usually not activ-
ists and instead focus their fund manager's time on evaluating a
company's financial performance and have no expertise in evaluating
individual directors. An activist role would also require them to invest
their internal resources on this additional (altruistic) activity, and there
is no evidence they would be willing to do so, when all shareholders
would reap the benefit. Not only do institutional holders typically
subscribe to the "Wall Street Rule" of selling if they are unsatisfied
with a company or board's performance, they may have competing in-
terests with other shareholders, because their particular investment
strategy requires a short-term instead of long-term horizon, for exam-
ple. Relying on large institutional shareholders to oversee this process
may not be wise.
The one percent threshold to place a shareholder access proposal
on the ballot is too low. This would allow, in essence, "the tail to wag
the dog," because only one percent of a company's shareholders
would be able to set a costly and time-consuming process in motion.
ommends against proposals to eliminate cumulative voting or proposals that require superma-
jority voting requirements. ISS Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary, available at
http://www.atalantasosnoff.com/2003_U.S.-Voting-Guidelines Summary.pdf (last visited
Mar. 25, 2005).
300. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,794.
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Is this fair to the other ninety-nine percent of the shareholders? While
a Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal can be placed on the ballot by any
shareholder that owns $2,000 Of stock, those proposals do not have the
potentially huge impact that naming one of the small handful of direc-
tors who "guide the ship" does. Moreover, they are predominately
advisory proposals anyway, so the directors must still consider the
overall best interests of the company in deciding whether to imple-
ment them.
The thirty-five percent withhold threshold for an individual direc-
tor is arbitrary and does not follow other corporate governance princi-
pals. Corporate law typically operates on a principal of "majority
rules," where in most cases, the deciding criteria is either the majority
of the outstanding shares or the majority of the shares voting on a pro-
posal, except in corporate take-overs and similar activities. Here, in-
stead, the rule proposes a new thirty-five percent threshold as an arbi-
trary number that purportedly signifies "shareholder dissatisfaction."
But this does not seem to be supported by any other area of existing
corporate law.
2. Time Period Too Long
If a company is struggling with its board's lack of response and
accountability to its shareholders, instituting a two-step, two-year
process before shareholders can act will only exacerbate a bad situa-
tion, potentially to the point where it is beyond repair or too late, as in
Enron. The last two years of corporate governance scandals described
in Part I show that even large companies can undergo rapid changes.
And at the end of two years these companies were all but subsumed
with problems and share value had disappeared. To truly protect
shareholders, any new paradigm must be triggered on short notice
when there is a problem indicated.
Also, the Proposed Rule forces shareholders to institute the proc-
ess to nominate a candidate, in order to preserve their right to do so,
long before the shareholder and directors may have had an opportunity
to work through any concerns. Rather than encouraging the share-
holders and board to first work together for constructive change and
amicable resolution, it pits shareholders against the company because
of the long fuse required.
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F. Disruptive and Will Not Improve the Selection Process
1. Premature and Costly
The new corporate governance regulatory scheme prompted by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is just now taking effect. We should assess
the impact of these new rules, their pros and cons, before piling more
rules upon rules without fully understanding their impacts, costs and
outcomes. The Proposed Rule addresses the same concerns that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the NYSE and Nasdaq Listing Rules, and the
Nomination Committee Rule have already addressed: board composi-
tion, independence, qualifications of board members, and communica-
tion between the board and shareholders. These new rules are likely
to encourage diligence and director scrutiny of company business op-
erations and management's actions. Independent directors know their
actions are being watched, now more closely than ever before. We
need to give these new rules time to show their effectiveness.
Moreover, while the SEC has estimated the cost of the new rule to
be $4,200 per company,30 industry experts expect the true cost of the
new rule to be in the neighborhood of $700,000 per company.0 2 This
wide divergence in the estimated cost of the rule signifies a problem
with interpreting how this rule would actually be implemented in the
market. Companies are just now assessing the costs of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, and it seems premature to impose additional huge costs
when it is not clear that those costs are warranted or will be effective.
2. Will Produce Worse Boards
a. Special Interest Directors
This rule will open the boardroom door to special interest direc-
tors-those that advance a narrow cause and/or represent a narrow
slice of shareholders. Special interest groups now dominate the Rule
14a-8 arena,30 3 and it would likely be that those same groups would
301. See Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 60,814.
302. Letter from Henry A. McKinnell, Chairman of the Business Roundtable, to Jonathan
G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Dec. 22, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s71903/brtl22203.htm.
303. See John C. Wilcox, The Growing Importance of Institutional Investors and Equity
Analysts for the M & A Agenda, PLI CORP. LAW PRACTICE COURSE, HANDBOOK SERIES No.
B4-7179 (1997), 973 PL/Corp 567, 574-77 ("The air of legitimacy which attached to institu-
tional activism has been co-opted by other proponents, including labor unions, grassroots or-
ganizations, and others traditionally categorized as gadflies ... who now numerically domi-
nate Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals," and the "proxy process has arguably been trivialized
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take advantage of this rule, to the detriment of other shareholders who
do not share that same special interest.
A nominee that does not share a visible tie with the nominating
shareholder (such that the nominee would fail the independence re-
quirements) is not necessarily truly and utterly independent. Common
social and business viewpoints and other non-contractual relationships
would not be covered by the independence standards. It is only natu-
ral that one shareholder (or a group of shareholders) nominating a
candidate will act in that particular holder's own self-interest. It is
utopian to believe that shareholders voluntarily and altruistically work
for the benefit of all.
While the theory of the Proposed Rule is good, history has shown
us that good theories do not always work out well in the "real world."
In theory, "a small percentage of large, long-term shareholders-with
nothing but the best interests of the company and all fellow sharehold-
ers in mind-will act in a neutral and unbiased manner to further the
corporation's interests by nominating a candidate for the Board who is
better than management's nominee. ' ' 30' However, as SEC Commis-
sioner Glassman pointed out, "Communism works.., in theory.
30 5
History has taught us, and the same applies here to the Proposed Rule:
If it sounds too good to be true, it probably is.
b. Less Qualified Candidates
Companies must balance the members of their board to serve spe-
cific needs identified by those close to the company. Outside share-
holders, even large ones, do not know the inner workings of the board-
room, the specialties each director brings to the board table, and those
qualities that may be absent. In addition, as board members come and
go, the balance of a board is constantly in flux, and the company must
always keep an eye on meeting mandatory governance requirements.
Allowing a shareholder to unilaterally nominate one or more directors
will potentially upset that balance and long-term board constituency
planning.
as special interest groups resume the dominant role sponsoring shareholder proposals.").
304. SEC Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, Remarks at the National Association of
Corporate Directors (Oct. 20, 2003), available at http/www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch 102003cag.htm#P32_10471.
305. Id. (quoting cartoon character Homer Simpson).
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c. Dysfunctional and Balkanized Boards
In order to effectively perform its role, the board should be com-
prised of members who can work together in a professional environ-
ment with a minimum of distraction and disruption. Some level of
collegiality must be present for the board members to work together
and with management. A candidate who has not been approved by the
company's management and other incumbent directors will likely not
work well with them and will be viewed instead as a "bull in the china
shop."
The Proposed Rule would result in directors with dual loyalties
and a divided, "balkanized" 3°6 board. This, in turn, will cause boards
to be distracted with internal politics, taking valuable time and energy
away from their primary duty to serve the company's shareholders.
Moreover, to serve as effective advisors to management, the board
members and management must share mutual respect and trust, and a
director who has been added to the board without the agreement of
management or the other board members will have a difficult time
earning that respect and trust.
3. Lack of Fiduciary Duty
The board is the only body that truly balances competing interests
of the constituents of a corporation-the board, the management, the
employees, the shareholders, the stakeholders and the community.
While some use a property analogy for stock ownership, 30 7 share-
holder rights are actually outlined according to state corporate statu-
tory law and by specific contracts, i.e. the corporation's articles and
bylaws. Moreover, agency theory and the accompanying agency
problems30 8 also appear inapplicable to the board setting because the
306. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.
2000), available at http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/Balkanize (Bal-
kanization is derived from "balkanize," which is "to divide (a region or territory) into small,
often hostile units."); see also CountryWatch, Balkanization, at http://www.country-
watch.com/@school/balkanization.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) ("The term generally de-
scribes the process of geopolitical fragmentation, and is used to depict any kind of political
dissolution across the world."). See generally Radom, supra note 65 (arguing for limited fed-
eral preemption of state securities regulations as a solution to the problem of balkanization).
307. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Empowering Shareholders, Pa-
per 86, BERKELEY PROGRAM IN LAW & ECON., WORKING PAPER SERIES,
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1 057&context=berkeley-law econ
(Mar. 1, 2003) (analogizing the shareholders' ownership of a public company to an individ-
ual's ownership of "a building in Seattle").
308. See generally Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation
for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 513, 514-15 (1993) (proposing an alternate frame-
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board's duty is to act in the best interests of the corporation and not
toward any specific individual shareholder.
While shareholders seeking to access the company's proxy state-
ment to promote their director candidate must comply with the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, there is no correspond-
ing requirement that they owe any fiduciary duty to the corporation or
their fellow shareholders in seeking to activate their rights under the
Proposed Rule.3" In contrast, the company's management, incumbent
directors and members of the nominating committee, who confer to
nominate who they believe are the best qualified candidates in the in-
terests of all shareholders, do owe a fiduciary duty, not only in manag-
ing the corporate assets, but also in making the nomination. Share-
holders will be best protected by having persons that owe that
fiduciary duty look out for their interests.
4. Out of Sync with International Standards
In other countries, shareholders typically have the authority to ap-
point and remove directors with "comparative ease," and some argue
the Proposed Rule will cause the United States to be "out of sync"
with practices in worldwide securities markets.31 In the United King-
dom, for example, shareholders may include a resolution to appoint a
director at any Annual General Meeting so long as the holder owns a
minimum of 100 fully paid shares or, alternatively, their shares repre-
sent at least five percent of shares entitled to vote at the meeting. 31 A
simple majority is required to pass the resolution, and the election out-
come is binding on the company. 31 2
In addition to voting against a director who is standing for re-
election, UK shareholders are also allowed to vote against the election
work to reduce agency costs through structuring management incentives for long-term corpo-
rate performance, thereby reducing the focus on maximizing short-term shareholder values
that is inherent in the recent trend toward managerialism).
309. However, a controlling shareholder may have obligations to the other shareholders.
See, e.g., Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 40 (Del. 1996) (noting that majority
shareholders may owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders); Ivanhoe Partners v. New-
mont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (noting that a shareholder owes a fidu-
ciary duty to other shareholders if it "owns majority interest in or exercises control over the
business affairs of the corporation") (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 958 (Del. 1985) and Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984)).
310. See Letter from Jean M.G. Frijns et al. to Jonathan Katz, Secretary of the SEC
(Dec. 19, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/foreign121903.htm. The twelve
signatories to this letter represent a group of large foreign institutional shareholders whose
members hold $722 billion in assets. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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of a director at the meeting that follows his/her original appoint-
ment. 1 3 Again, a simple majority is required, and the outcome is
binding on the company. 3 4 Shareholders who hold shares represent-
ing ten percent or more of voting capital of a company are entitled to
call an Extraordinary General Meeting, at which they can include
resolutions to appoint and/or remove directors.315 These also require a
simple majority and are binding.3"6
Similar rules apply for the director nomination and election proc-
esses in Australia, France, Germany, India, Ireland, New Zealand,
South Africa, Sweden and other countries who have modeled their
statutes on UK company law.3 17
G. Back to Basics-Let's Play Fair
1. Common Goal
Companies and their shareholders share a common goal to create
a healthy economy through long-term business operations and suc-
cessful competition in the world economy. This should not be based
on intrinsic shareholder rights being exercised in a hostile environ-
ment, but should instead be based on social and economic utility.
Shareholders and managers should work cooperatively toward busi-
ness success, rather than shareholders dictating managerial conduct
based on their intrinsic rights and individual interests. A paradigm
that instead promotes a serious, collaborative and constructive dia-
logue between shareholders and the company's board of directors
would be more efficient than one that creates hostilities and dichot-
omy.
Through corporate America's newly-adopted regulatory scheme
of corporate governance, on which the "ink is still wet," shareholders
and directors can work together toward these goals. We only need to
give them time to be effective. We have the right tools; we should en-
courage rather than discourage their use.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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2. Use the Right Tool-Nominating Committees
The Proposed Rule presumes that nominating committees, even as
re-constituted under newly-adopted regulations, will not be effective
at responding to shareholder concerns. But this is an unfair assump-
tion, because those committees have not even had a chance to operate
under the new paradigm. This leads one to wonder why we spent the
better part of the last two years adopting regulations that very specifi-
cally created independence in boards and their committees and trans-
parency in their operations, if we did not believe these were the an-
swers to protecting shareholders.
Rather than making a company's nominating committee a "lame
duck," which the Proposed Rule would in essence do, the aim should
be to ensure its effectiveness. Shareholders should not be encouraged
to circumvent the company's board and its nominating committee. In-
stead, we want the committee members to listen and be held account-
able to the company's shareholders.
Through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the NYSE and Nasdaq List-
ing Rules, regulations are now in place to ensure that the nominating
committee members are independent. Central to our system of corpo-
rate governance is the notion that independent directors are indeed
able to represent the best interests of shareholders, and independent
directors are accountable to the shareholders. Following that same no-
tion then, those independent nominating committee members can be
charged with the same responsibilities of listening, protecting and be-
ing held accountable to the shareholders.
The new Nominating Committee Rule ensures that not only are
the operations of the committee transparent and understandable to
shareholders, but also that the shareholders will have the information
they need to give relevant input to the committee, which will garner
the committee's attention. And while technically only requiring dis-
closure of the communication system a company has in place between
its shareholders and individual board members, it seems this disclo-
sure requirement will cause virtually all companies to adopt such a
system, if it did not previously exist. This new framework of inde-
pendence and information is poised to serve the goal of ensuring that
the nominating committee is responsive to shareholder concerns.
Selecting individual directors is a key component to a company's
success, both in creating value and in protecting that value for all
shareholders. It should come at the consensus of the many constitu-
ents, not at the direction of a powerful one or few. The committee
members who are inside the boardroom are the ones best positioned to
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determine the needs of the company, not outside shareholders, who
may have a hidden agenda. Shareholders should indeed participate in
the director selection process, but by working closely with the ap-
pointed nominating committee, rather than stepping into the arena of
managing the internal affairs of a company, which is a role reserved
for those with expertise and fiduciary duties.
Increased shareholder input into the nominating committee proc-
ess, by ensuring the committee members are independent and the op-
erations are transparent, will provide the benefits the Proposed Rule
attempts to gain. Moreover, encouraging use of truly independent and
transparent nominating committees does not have the unintended
negative consequences associated with the Proposed Rule. With the
increased attention the Proposed Rule has now brought on the topic,
we should give these newly formulated committees an opportunity to
prove whether we have sufficiently regulated this area, before we
cross the line into over-regulating it.
CONCLUSION
Corporate scandals have caused the investing community and
regulatory agencies to take a second look at those who would be "cap-
tain of the ship." Shareholders understandably want a board they can
put their full trust in, and the recent scandals have caused many inves-
tors to rightfully question those at the top. While more shareholder
voice in the director nomination process is in theory a good thing, the
SEC's proposed shareholder direct access rule will not prove an effec-
tive method of electing a board of directors who can and will protect
and create value for all shareholders. Not only is the rule based on
questionable legal authority, but it also lacks tools to be truly effec-
tive. Instead of piling rules upon rules, the new regulatory scheme,
provided by the recently-enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the NYSE and
Nasdaq Listing Rules, and the Nominating Committee Rule, provides
the necessary independence, additional transparency, and increased
shareholder voice in the nominating process. Shareholders and direc-
tors can work together toward their common goals under the newly
created paradigm. If, however, time tells us the system is still "bro-
ken," then, and only then, should the SEC move to "fix it." For now,
the shareholder direct access rule is simply overkill and will upset the
fine teeter-totter balance between shareholder voice and investor pro-
tection.
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